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American Policy Toward China

*Statement by Secretary Acheson*¹

Chairman Russell. The Committee will be in order.

Mr. Secretary, you may proceed in your own way.

Secretary Acheson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I will take advantage of the kindness of the Committee in permitting me to make a somewhat extended statement on United States policy in regard to China.

I should like to state at the outset what I am going to try to do, and that is I want to present to the Committee the problem which confronted the United States and China in 1945; and in doing that I shall have to give some of its roots in history.

I should like to point out what the times of decision were. There were moments in this period from 1945 on, moments of decision, and I should like to point out those moments. I should like to point out the considerations which were taken under advisement when decisions were made, and I should like to say what the decisions were and how they were made.

One further preliminary observation I think is important, and that is that American aid cannot in itself insure the survival of a recipient government or the survival of a people that this Government is trying to help against aggression.

What our aid must do and can do is to supplement the efforts of that recipient government and of that people itself. It cannot be a substitute for those efforts. It can only be an aid and a supplement to them.

The United States Government, in aiding another government, does not have power of decision within that country or within that government. That power of decision remains with the govern-

ment, the people in it. Those are thoughts I think we should have in mind.

Our Relations With China in 1945

With those preliminary statements, we come to the problem which faced the Chinese and American Governments in 1945.

The Japanese had been defeated. The Chinese Government was in the extreme southwestern part of China. The task which had to be solved by the Chinese Government was, in effect, how to create a nation, and how to have the authority of the Chinese Government exercised throughout that nation.

Now, I do not say recreate a nation; I say, advisedly, create a nation; because for almost an indefinite period in the past there had not been in our sense, a nation in the territory which we call China, and I will come to and explain to you why that is so, a nation in the sense of a government in control throughout that area.

Therefore, the question which had to be faced was how to create that nation and how to create the authority of the nation in that area.

Senator Wiley. Who was Secretary of State then at that time?

Secretary Acheson. The Secretary of State at that time was Mr. Byrnes. Mr. Stettinius was Secretary until the middle of—until the spring of 1945—and Mr. Byrnes became Secretary then.

The Chinese Government that we are talking about—the Nationalist Government—had not had authority—indeed, no Chinese Government had had authority, by which I mean substantial authority—throughout China since the period of the Manchus.

Here is the picture which confronted everybody at the time I am talking about. The great northern area of China, Manchuria, was occupied by the Soviet Union, with its own armed forces. In the second place, the north central and southeast parts of China were in the control of the Communists and the Japanese.

¹ Made on June 4 before the Senate Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Committees and released to the press on that date. Part 1 of the hearings on the military situation in the Far East covering May 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 14 has been printed. Also printed as Department of State publication 4255 for sale at Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. for 20¢.

I say both the Communists and the Japanese because the Japanese held the cities and the major lines of communication; whereas, the surrounding areas were occupied by the Communists.

That part of China included what we call North China, swinging down through central China, on to the southeast and coming quite far south and southeast in China.

The south central and southern part of China was occupied by the Japanese, who had troops along the coast and for considerable areas inland and the government itself was, as I said before, in the extreme southwestern part of China.

Another important fact, which must never be lost sight of in our consideration, is that, in addition to these facts as to who actually occupied and exercised authority in certain parts of China, all of China was in the grip of a very profound social revolution.

Senator Smith. Might I ask just one question to get my dates right?

I wanted to ask the Secretary whether this was prior to the Yalta conference, or afterwards?

Yalta was in February, '45, and this period you are speaking of was subsequent?

Secretary Acheson. I am talking about VJ-Day, about the problem which faced us at the end of the war.

Senator Smith. Thank you.

Secretary Acheson. General MacArthur has spoken to you about the depth and strength of this social revolution.

It grew out of a similar experience in almost all wars, that as the governments concerned have to make tremendous efforts, as, in some areas, the controls of government become weakened and promises are made, people move forward in social economic ways; at least they move forward in acquiring new social and economic rights; and this was going on in China, in the age-long battle between the peasants and the landlords.

The peasants had made advances and there was a new idea of profound importance.

Communist Control in China

If I may speak briefly, on the general area of Communist control:

The Communists controlled an area containing 116 million people, which was one-fourth of the population of China. The geographical area was 15 percent of the country we call China, exclusive of Manchuria.

This area included in it some of the most heavily populated areas of China, the area which had most of the railway communications, important industrial developments, and important cities.

Now, let us take a look at Manchuria.

Manchuria, except in a wholly nominal way, and then only for a period of 2 or 3 years, part of '28, '29, '30 and part of '31, had never been in any way under the control of the present Na-

tionalist government of China; and, until his death in 1927 or '28, the old Marshal had been the war lord of Manchuria, and controlled it absolutely.

Upon his death, the young Marshal took over his authority, and in 1928 after Chiang Kai-shek had taken Peking and defeated the Communists and the northern war lords, the young Marshal announced his adherence to the National Government. That was a pretty nominal adherence.

It meant that he recognized the government of Chiang Kai-shek as the National Government of China, but the administration in Manchuria did not change, and he continued to exercise the authority.

However, that authority continued for a very short period of time, and in 1931 the Japanese invaded Manchuria and set up their puppet state, and all Chinese authority disappeared from Manchuria. I mention this to point out to you that the National Government had no roots of any sort in Manchuria, a very important thing for us to remember.

When we come to North China, we find that in 1927 the struggle between the left wing of the Kuomintang Party, which was established at Hankow, and the right wing of the party under Chiang Kai-shek came to a head. The Chiang Kai-shek forces won, the Russians, Borodin, who was then advising the Government, had to flee from China, and in 1928 Chiang Kai-shek moved into Peking and there announced the official unification of China. That was in 1928.

The battle with the Communists which began in 1927 in open warfare continued until '36, and in the period of '34 and '35 the Communists were forced to make their long march from the southeastern portion of China to the northwestern portion of China. There they established themselves in the period '34-'35.

In the meantime, however, the Japanese who were in Manchuria were moving into North China, and in 1935 the Japanese undertook to set up another puppet state in North China which would comprise the five northern provinces of China; and at that time they had sufficient physical control of the area to do that.

I point all of this out to make clear to you again that in North China the authority of Chiang Kai-shek's government, which was established in 1928, had been in very large part eliminated by 1935, and instead of his government having power in North China, that was in part controlled through Japanese puppets, Japanese, and in part was controlled by the Communists in the northwest.

With this review then, let us just mention once more the principal problems which confronted the Chinese Government and confronted the American Government in its efforts to help the Chinese Government.

These were: The Soviets in Manchuria, the Japanese and the Chinese struggling against one

another to control a vast area in northwest, north central and southeast China—the Communists I have already mentioned—and at the same time this great problem of the revolution in thought and in social relationships which was going on throughout all China.

So the first period of decision, the first time after the war when important decisions were made and had to be made, was the period 1945 and 1946. Now, I do not mean for a moment that important decisions were not made before and after, but that was the first great moment of decision.

Recommendations of General Wedemeyer's Report

The situation was stated in a nutshell by General Wedemeyer in November 1945 very shortly after VJ-Day, and I should like to read, not very much, but I should like to read from General Wedemeyer's report in November 1945.

He says:

Chinese Communist guerrillas and saboteurs can, and probably will, if present activities are a reliable indication, restrict and harass the movements of National Government forces to such an extent that the result will be a costly and extended campaign. Logistical support for the National Government forces, and measures for their security in the heart of Manchuria have not been fully appreciated by the Generalissimo or his Chinese staff. These facts, plus the lack of appropriate forces and transport, have caused me to advise the Generalissimo that he should concentrate his efforts on the recovery of North China and the consolidation of his military and political position there, prior to any attempt to occupy Manchuria. I received the impression that he agreed with this concept.

Now, General Wedemeyer has five conclusions to this report of 1945:

1. That the Generalissimo will be able to stabilize the situation in South China, provided he accepts the assistance of foreign administrators and technicians, and engages in political, economic, and social reforms through honest, competent civilian officials.

2. He will be unable to stabilize the situation in North China for months, and perhaps, even years, unless a satisfactory settlement with the Chinese Communists is achieved, and followed up realistically by the kind of action suggested in paragraph one—that is the paragraph which has just been talked about, the political, economic, and social reforms.

3. He will be unable to occupy Manchuria for many years unless satisfactory agreements are reached with Russia and the Chinese Communists.

4. Russia is in effect creating favorable conditions for the realization of Chinese Communist, and possibly their own plans, in North China and Manchuria. These activities are violations of the recent Sino-Soviet treaty and related agreements.

5. It appears remote that a satisfactory understanding will be reached between Chinese Communists and the National Government.

Now, in short, what General Wedemeyer reported and advised was, first of all, that the Generalissimo must consolidate his own position in South China and to do that he must take into consideration this revolution that I have been talking about. And General Wedemeyer stressed then—and you will see over and over again he stresses—the same point, that there must be political, economic, and social reforms in order that the Chinese Government might put itself at the head of this great demand for improvement, which was existing in China, and not allow the Communists or anybody else to take that advantage away from them.

In the second place, he points out that to establish himself in North China he must come to agreement with the Communists.

In the third place, he points out the only way to establish himself in Manchuria is through agreement with the Russians.

He ends up by saying that the outlook on all of these fronts is dark, and he points out that force is not available to accomplish these efforts, partly because force cannot accomplish some of them, and secondly, because there is not enough force available to take on the problems which I have already mentioned.

Three Choices Open to United States

Now, in that situation the United States Government had three choices open to it.

One choice was to pull out of China and say, "We have defeated the Japanese. The Chinese from now on must paddle their own canoe, and we have to wash our hands of it." That was an impossible choice to take because with the presence of 1,235,000 armed Japanese troops in China, exclusive of Manchuria, and of another 1,700,000 Japanese civilians—government officials, economic people, clerks, and businessmen, one thing or another—there was a Japanese force and a Japanese influence so great in China that by throwing its weight to either side in this civil war it could have taken over the administration of the country, and Japan in defeat would have found itself in actual control of China, a result which we could not, of course, help to bring about.

The second choice was that the United States Government might have put into China unlimited resources and all the necessary military power to try and defeat the Communists, remove the Japanese, and remove the Russians from Manchuria.

That was a task so great and so repugnant to the American people that the Government could not undertake it, and it was one which was not in accord with American interests.

The third choice, and the one which was chosen, was to give important assistance of all sorts to the Chinese Government and to assist in every way in the preservation of peace in China and the working out of the agreements which were so necessary

to enable the Chinese Government to reestablish itself in those parts of China where it had been before and to get, for the first time, into areas of China where it never had been.

Now, I should like briefly to talk about the Chinese Communist situation and the background of that as it existed in 1945, and then I will take up each of the other elements of this problem.

The relations between the Nationalist Government and the Communists have had a long history in China. I shall not take time to go through it all.

Prior to 1927, there was a period of collaboration. From 1927 to 1937 there was a period of war. From 1937 onward there was again a period in which the official attitude of both the Government and the Communists was that the differences between them were political in nature, had to be settled by political means; beginning in 1937 they worked out arrangements for collaboration in fighting the Japanese, which never were very effective, but were agreements between them.

Later on, as you will see, they began working very vigorously at arrangements to bring about a settlement by negotiation in China. This official view was stated by the Generalissimo on September 13, 1943, where he said—and this is one of many times when he said this from 1937 on—

I am of the opinion that first of all we should clearly recognize that the Chinese Communist problem is a purely political problem and should be solved by political means.

As I said, there was an agreement reached between them in 1937 for their joint efforts against the Japanese. That agreement did not work, and reports were made over and over again that a very large part of the Communist armed forces and a very large part of the Nationalist armed forces were immobilized so far as the war against Japan was concerned because they stood facing one another and maneuvering against one another.

It was the effort of our Government throughout the war period to try and reach some kind of an arrangement so that these two forces instead of watching one another would both fight the Japanese. In they did that, there was a very important contribution to the war.

I will not go into all the efforts that were made by General Stillwell and others in the early period.

In the spring of 1944 Vice President Wallace went on a mission for President Roosevelt. Among other places, he went to China, and there he had talks with the Generalissimo, and they talked about two of the great important problems that I have been discussing. One was Manchuria and the other was the Communists.

The Generalissimo was most anxious to get help of the United States in improving relations, as he stated it, between China and the Soviet Union, because, without that improvement, the prospects for China were very difficult indeed. They discussed what could be done along that line.

They also discussed the Communist problem,

and the Generalissimo pointed out vigorously that the Communists were, as he stated it, not people of good faith, claimed that they were not Chinese, that they had their interests with an alien power. But, nevertheless, he said,

This is a political problem and we have got to settle it by political means.

He stated that he would not regard any help from the United States, in attempting that, to be meddling into the internal affairs of China, and he would be grateful for help.

And finally, before Vice President Wallace left China, he reversed the position which he had taken earlier in which he had opposed any American military people having any relations with the Communists, and withdrew his objection to that.

The Hurley Mission

Now in the fall of 1944 and after these discussions, the President sent another personal representative to China, and that was General Hurley. General Hurley was not then ambassador. He became ambassador in the early part of '45, but he went out as the personal representative of the President in order to try and unify this military effort, and there, with the consent and approval of the Generalissimo and of his cabinet, he undertook to act as mediator between the Yen'an Communist authorities and the Chungking Nationalist authorities, and they had meetings, some in Yen'an at which General Hurley was present, some in Chungking in which they worked out a series of agreements.

Some of these agreements had to do with the conduct of the war, and then some of them went beyond that, and a very important and basic agreement was worked out.

The beginning of it was under the mediation of General Hurley. It was announced on October 11, 1945, and that was the agreement on the general principles of a peaceful settlement of the differences between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists.

It was announced after General Hurley's departure from China and was made public, as I said, on October 11. This called for the convening of the National Assembly and for a political consultative conference of all party and nonparty leaders.

It called for the inauguration of a constitutional government for all of China; for the formation of a committee of government and Communist representatives to discuss the reorganization of the armies and the reduction of all the armed forces in China.

Now, these agreements were of the greatest possible importance, and they established the basis for the efforts which General Marshall later took on.

May I just pause again for a moment to point

out that the problem between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists differed in one important respect from the relations between—from the problems of governments, say, in Europe after the war with Communists in their country, because in China the Communists were not scattered through the population as an element of the population. They were people who had a defined area, with a large population subject to their control, 116 million.

They had a government of their own; they had any army of their own; and, in effect, they had a separate country within China, and the task was to put these two things together so that there would be one country and one government. Now, that was what they were working on.

Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Secretary, I hate to interrupt, but you said October 11, 1945.

Secretary Acheson. 1945.

Senator Saltonstall. You meant that? That was a year after Hurley was there then?

Secretary Acheson. No; Mr. Hurley left in 1945; he left just before this.

Senator Saltonstall. Oh!

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Senator Wiley. Who signed those agreements—those agreements? You said they worked out agreements. Who signed them?

Secretary Acheson. They were agreements between the Chinese Government, the Nationalist Government, and the Communist authorities at Yen-an.

Senator Wiley. They both signed it?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir.

Now, I have dealt with the background of this Communist business, and I am coming back to that, when we get to the mission of General Marshall.

I now want to go back and deal with a problem that has to do with another important aspect of this thing, and that is, Manchuria.

The Yalta Agreements

I want to talk about Yalta.

The Yalta agreements were made in the very early part of 1945. Later on, in August of '45, treaties were signed between the Chinese Nationalist Government, and the Soviet Union, which grew out of and were based upon these Yalta agreements.

Now, first of all, the Yalta agreements, from the point of view of the wartime effort and the interest of the United States and its major fighting allies—I think this has been referred to many times and I shall make it brief—at the time these agreements were entered into at Yalta, we did not know whether we had an atomic bomb or not. That was not proved until some months later, that we had one, and it was not used until considerably later.

It was the then military opinion, concurred in by everyone, that the reduction of Japan would

have to be brought about by a large-scale landing on the islands of Japan, and the forecast of that fighting, which came from the fighting on the other islands in the Pacific, indicated that it would be a very bloody and terrible battle.

It was of the utmost importance that the Russians should come into the war in the Far East, in time.

Now, there was very little doubt that they would come in, but the grave danger was that they would really wait until the war was over and until we had expended our effort and blood to win the war, and they would come in and do what they wished.

It was very important, in the view of the military people, and the others, too, present, that they should come in in time, so that none of the 700,000 Japanese troops in Manchuria, and none, if possible, of the 1,235,000 Japanese troops in China, would come back to strengthen the troops on the main islands of Japan; but that they would be occupied with the Russian effort on the mainland.

That was the purpose, and in making the agreements, the price which was paid for the agreements was that 3 months after the end of the European war, the Russians would enter the Far East war; that they should have the southern half of Sakhalin, the Kuriles; that their former rights in Port Arthur and Dairen should be returned to them; and their former interest in the two railways in Manchuria.

The Russians took the same attitude toward these rights that the Chinese took toward their rights in Formosa.

The Russians had lost theirs to the Japanese by war in 1904; the Chinese had lost theirs to the Japanese by war in 1895.

Russia made its claim for those rights, and the claims were granted at this meeting at Yalta.

Senator Hickenlooper. Would the Secretary mind an interruption at this point?

Chairman Russell. He stated that he preferred not to be—

Secretary Acheson. If I could get through, first.

Chairman Russell. What is your preference in the matter, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Acheson. I would very much appreciate it if I could make my statement first, because I might get badly off, if I got into side discussions.

It is hard to keep so much material in one's mind.

One of the other things that I should like to point out about Yalta was that unquestionably the Russians had it in their power not only to take what was conceded to them, but much more, besides.

There was very little likelihood that anybody would have the will, and few people could have the power, to throw them out of any area on the mainland which they might occupy, and where they might wish to remain, so that this agreement gave them the basis for a legal claim to some-

thing considerably less than they might have taken without a legal claim.

I should also like to point out that at the time the Chinese entered into this treaty with the Russians, a few months after Yalta, that is, in August 1945, they regarded the arrangements which they had made with the Russians on the basis of Yalta, as very satisfactory.

Such statements were expressed by the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, and by the Chinese Foreign Minister. In fact, in 1947 the Chinese Foreign Minister expressed grave apprehension that the Soviet Union might cancel the treaty with China of 1945, in which China had conferred these rights to the bases in Port Arthur, the interests in Dairen, and the interest in the railway.

They regarded that as a very valuable treaty because it also carried with it the obligation of the Russians to evacuate Manchuria, to recognize the Chinese Nationalist Government, and to aid in the reestablishment of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria.

Now these agreements, as I shall point out later on, did have a very important effect and bearing when it came to the question of the reoccupation of Manchuria by the Chinese, because it was on the basis of these agreements that both the Chinese Communists and the Russians agreed to occupation by the National Government's forces.

Now may I speak briefly about the problem of the Japanese, and here I shall have to get a little bit out of the chronological order and perhaps run this Japanese part through to its end.

I have pointed out to you the very great importance of the presence of the Japanese in China, the 1,235,000 troops, 1,700,000 civilians. It was decided very early in the game, between the Chinese Government, the Nationalist Government and ourselves, that one of our major efforts must be to get these people out of China and back into Japan.

That wouldn't have been too hard a job to do if they were all just marching on to ships. The great difficulty about it was that these armed soldiers controlled most of the important cities in central China, in southeast China and east China, and also the main lines of communication.

If they had been told to drop their guns on the ground and march to the coast at once, those areas would have been occupied by the Communists, and the Nationalist Government forces would never have gotten in there without fighting.

Therefore the task was to have the Japanese evacuate the areas which they held at the time when the Government forces could be moved and were moved by us into those areas. That was the task to perform.

In order to do that we landed 50,000 Marines in China. The function of these Marines was to occupy the principal seaports, to guard the principal rail lines close to those seaports, and later to take over the areas along the eastern coast where coal was produced and guard the lines along which

the coal came to the principal consuming centers. That was to allow the industrial life of China to continue, and those coal areas and the coal railroads were being constantly raided by the Communists.

So the Marines had to go in there, hold coal, which was the heart of the industrial life of China, hold the seaports so that they would not be captured by Communists, and then receive the Japanese as they were marched to the railheads and down their railroads, and put them on ships and take them back to Japan.

At the same time our armed forces airlifted Chinese armies, whole armies, from South China into the areas to be evacuated and which were being evacuated by the Japanese. Now that was a tremendous undertaking most skillfully carried out, and it was that undertaking which permitted the Chinese Government to really get back into areas of China which it would have had the utmost difficulty in even getting into without that colossal effort.

By the end of '46 we had removed 3 million Japanese, just a few thousand under 3 million, from China to Japan—one of the great mass movements of people.

After the agreements between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists that I have spoken of in 1945, October 11, 1945, armed clashes broke out again between the two parties; and both the government authorities, the Chinese Government authorities, and the American Government authorities, were gravely disturbed that civil war would break out.

If that happened, then the whole chance of dealing with any of the problems which you and I have been discussing this morning would disappear.

If there was civil war going on in China, fighting between the Government forces and the Communist forces, all possibility of removing the Japanese either disappeared or was gravely diminished.

The possibility of occupying North China became much dimmer; the possibility of moving into Manchuria became nonexistent; and the possibility of really getting any reforms in South China or any other part of China would be greatly diminished. So, the peace became a major objective of both the Chinese Government and the United States Government in its efforts to help the Chinese Government.

The Marshall Mission

It was in that situation that General Marshall was asked by the President to go to China at the end of 1945.

Senator Wiley. 1945?

Secretary Acheson. At the end of 1945. He went in December, arriving there early in January, I believe, 1946.

At the outset I will go into a matter of detail which really is quite out of place in the broad picture which I am trying to paint for you here; but, since it has been talked about a great deal, I think it is important to clear it up, and that is the preparation of the instructions which were issued to General Marshall.

I think he was questioned about that, and there have been various charges and countercharges having to do with the preparation of those instructions. The story is very simple.

At the end of November 1945, Secretary Byrnes and General Marshall met. This was after General Marshall had been asked to go to China.

Secretary Byrnes read him a memorandum suggesting the outline of instructions for him. General Marshall did not approve of it.

General Marshall said that he would wish to try his own hand, assisted by some of his associates, in drafting the instructions.

This he did; and a draft was prepared by him, in conjunction with four generals who were working very closely with General Marshall. This was submitted to Secretary Byrnes.

On the 8th of December Secretary Byrnes made his suggestions to General Marshall—that is, suggestions of changes or alterations or additions to the draft prepared by General Marshall.

General Marshall's draft, with Secretary Byrnes' suggestions, was discussed at a meeting in Secretary Byrnes' office on Sunday morning, December 9, 1945, by Secretary Byrnes, General Marshall, Mr. John Carter Vincent, General Hull, and myself. I was then Undersecretary of State.

Those of us went over the instructions. General Marshall approved the suggestions made by Secretary Byrnes, and we then had a completely agreed draft.

In the course of that meeting the outline of a letter from the President to General Marshall was discussed and directions were given for its preparation.

There was also approved at the meeting a memorandum from Secretary Byrnes to the Secretary of War, requesting certain help in connection with the removal of the Japanese and the movement of Chinese armies into the North and laying down certain restrictions on those movements.

There was also agreed upon the form of a press release, I believe—it was agreed that day or a few days later—but the important papers were agreed at that meeting.

They were taken up by Secretary Byrnes with the President, who went over them; and they were put in final shape, unchanged from the agreements of December 9.

The President then had a meeting with General Marshall, at which I was present—there were three of us at that meeting, the President, General Marshall, and myself—and at that point the signed letter and the inclosures were handed to General Marshall.

It was ascertained by the President at that meeting that these papers were unanimously approved and agreeable to all concerned, and to himself.

Now, that is the account of the preparation of these instructions.

All the papers concerned are printed in the White Book, with one exception. The press release, which I mentioned a moment ago, which was given out on the 15th of December—everything in the press release was in General Marshall's instructions. In other words, the press release was a verbatim statement of what was in the instructions to General Marshall, except that certain paragraphs in the instructions were omitted from the press release.

One of those omissions had to do with what is printed in the White Paper and in the memorandum from Secretary Byrnes to the Secretary of War. That was the discretion and authority given to General Marshall in not moving Nationalist Government troops into areas in which there was fighting until he thought that that was a wise thing to do.

That was not to be stated and released because obviously it wouldn't work if it were.

Another omission, two other omissions had to do with things which we would do if the Chinese Government asked us to do it. Obviously you do not print in the newspapers that you will do something if somebody else asks you to. You leave it to the other person to ask you to do that if they wish. That is the story of the instructions.

General Marshall arrived in China at the very end of December 1945. By February 1946, three major agreements had been reached between the Chinese Government and the Communists. These agreements grew out of the earlier agreements of October 11, 1945, which discussed the general principles for working out peacefully the differences between the Communists and the Government.

The agreements of January and February 1946 carried into considerable detail how this should be done. In regard to these three agreements which I shall describe, General Marshall had a part only in one, and that was in the first one.

The first agreement was for the cessation of hostilities.² It provided that all fighting should cease, and it provided for the setting up of an Executive headquarters in which there would be American chairmanship and Nationalist and Communist representation, the purpose of this Executive headquarters being to bring the fighting to an end, and these tripartite teams were set up which went to every area where there was any clashing between the troops, and together they brought that fighting

²Mr. Acheson made a correction in subsequent testimony, stating: "... I said, through inadvertence, that General Marshall participated only in the cessation of hostilities.

"He also participated in the reorganization of the Army ...

"The one he did not participate in was the governmental reorganization and the constitutional."

to an end and tried to have that truce develop into a more substantial truce.

General Marshall played a very considerable part in working this out. The Executive headquarters was the really great instrumentality which set up and worked very well until the two parties fell apart—then nothing worked.

The second agreement was an agreement for governmental reorganization and for a constitutional government, and the third agreement was for a military reorganization and the integration of the Communist forces into those of the National Government.

As I said, General Marshall participated in the negotiations for the cessation of hostilities, but he did not participate in working out the second or the third agreement.

The second agreement for working out a constitutional government recognized the preponderant strength of the Kuomintang position in the National Government. It provided that there was to be an interim state council, sort of a provisional government, which would govern until the new constitution was established and elections were held throughout China and a constitutional government was set up in which all the people of China would have their representatives, and which would function on a two-party or multiparty system.

The interim state council was to function in this interim period as the supreme organ of the state. The Kuomintang Party was given 20 of the 40 seats in this national council. The other 20 seats were distributed among the Communists and the other parties and to some nonparty people. It was provided that the Generalissimo, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, as the President of China, should select all the members of the council, that is, he would select those from his own party and those from all the other parties. However, he would have to appoint a certain number from these other minority parties. That would leave him with 20 people whom he had selected from his own party, with 20 people whom he had selected from the other parties, including the Communists, and it would also leave him with a veto over any action of this council which could only be overridden by a three-fifths vote, which could not be done if his own party stayed with him.

Now, that, I say, was the temporary government. That was to continue until the constitution was to be agreed upon on May 4, through the National Assembly, May 4, 1946, and it was hoped that at an early date, sometime in '46 or '47, I believe it was, there could be an election, and they would then set up a regular constitutional government with legislative, judicial and executive branches, in which all parts of China would be represented, so that this country would have a government extending over all the area.

The third agreement had to do with the amalgamation of the forces, and that was the most im-

portant one. It provided that there should be a great reduction in forces on both sides, because China could not support the tremendous military establishment which existed on the Nationalist side and on the Communist side together.

The army was to consist of 60 divisions. Of those 60 divisions, 50 were to be National Government divisions and 10 were to be Communist divisions. These divisions were to be grouped together in armies, armies which would contain three divisions or whatever the Chinese military order of battle is. There would be several divisions in each army.

The divisions were to be stationed in certain numerical strengths in various parts of China.

The important thing here about the agreement, as we look back on it, was that so far as Manchuria was concerned, the agreement provided that in Manchuria there should be 15 divisions of the new government's troops. Of those 15 divisions, 14 should be national government divisions and one should be a Communist division. That was of the greatest possible importance. If that could have been carried out, the whole situation might have been very different.

In 1946 the situation of comparative peace which had been brought about as a result of the agreements in the early part of the year began to deteriorate. Fighting broke out in various places.

General Marshall, in trying to stop this fighting, through the Executive headquarters, got drawn into greater detail in some of the political negotiations between the two parties, because this fighting rapidly took on political aspects.

One side or the other would believe that it could gain an advantage by capturing this or that city or area, and believed it could strengthen itself in the negotiations; and then would start an attack. Either the Communists would attack the Nationalists or the Nationalists would attack the Communists, and in that way this situation became worse and worse; and General Marshall's efforts were unable to deal with it.

Therefore, the whole discussions between the Communists and the Nationalists in the attempt to work out the interim government, and the long-term constitutional government, got into more and more and more confusion and trouble.

The Prime Minister of China, Doctor Sun Fo, has an interesting comment on this period. In a New Year's message which he delivered on January 1, 1949, speaking of the period which I have been discussing, he said:

The Government had decided to call this conference because it was generally realized that the country and the people needed recuperation and peace, so that rehabilitation work could be started. Had these measures been carried out at that time all of us would have seen more prosperity and happiness in our midst. Unfortunately, all the parties concerned could not completely abandon their own selfish ends and the people in general did not exert sufficient influence in promoting this peace movement.

The result of the breakdown was that the situation developed into one of very considerable fighting by the end of 1946, and when General Marshall left China in 1947, January 1947, to return to Washington, the American effort to mediate in this struggle between the Government and the Communists ended.

General Marshall issued a long statement, which I shall not bother to read to you now, but it sums up very clearly his understanding of the difficulties which brought failure to his mission, and his understanding of the difficulties in the Chinese Government, which could not really permit it to function unless they were removed.

These difficulties, in some respects, had their roots in the fact that the liberal elements in the Kuomintang Party were the ones which were dealt with much more severely by the war and the inflation. Inflation and war tend to eliminate the middle class, and that is where the liberal elements came into the Kuomintang, and as the inflation and the war went forward, the power in the party shifted more to the extreme right wing; and General Marshall, in his farewell message, spoke of the importance of more liberal leadership in the Kuomintang Party itself.

But as I say, the effort to mediate came to an end with his departure. From then on we go into the military period of the struggle between the two Governments.

Military Struggle Between Nationalists and Communists

The National Government reached a peak of its military holdings toward the end of 1946. In the middle of '46 it had approximately 3,000,000 men under arms. These were opposed by something over 1,000,000 Communist troops of whom about 400,000 were not regulars but were guerrilla troops.

Until the end of '46 and the early part of '47, the gains, the military gains made by the Nationalist Government appeared to be impressive, but in fact they were not, and General Marshall repeatedly pointed out to the Government that what it was doing was overextending itself militarily and politically, since it neither had sufficient troops to garrison this whole area nor did it have sufficient administrators to administer the areas that it was taking over.

Therefore what it was doing by this military advance was weakening itself both militarily and through administrative ineptitude, because it didn't have the necessary administrators; it was not giving the people of the occupied areas what they had been led to expect when the National Government came in, so politically it was doing itself harm, and militarily it was doing itself harm.

General Barr points out it was during this period that what he calls the wall psychology took possession of the Chinese Nationalist Army. He had

pointed out over and over again that in modern warfare the most disastrous of all things to do is to retreat into a city behind walls and take a defensive position. Modern warfare must be a war of maneuver.

Therefore, time and time and time again, these Nationalist lines got pushed way forward; finally the troops at the end take up defensive positions behind some kind of walls, a long line of communication has to be guarded, which eventually is cut, and over and over again the troops at the end of the line either go over to the side of the enemy without firing a shot, or sufficient of them do so that those who want to fight can't fight.

That was the story of the war from 1946 on. At first, it looked very successful—lots of areas occupied, important cities taken—but the armies all go to garrison, they become immobilized, and maneuver and initiative is left with the Communists.

At the end of '46 the Government had 2,600,000 men under arms and the Communists had about 1,100,000 of regulars.

However, in firepower, in rifle firepower, the Government still enjoyed a superiority of 3 or 4 to 1 over the Communists.

In '46, when this fighting started, General Marshall was acting as mediator. He called on both sides to stop the fighting. Both professed to want to do it, but did not do it.

Therefore, General Marshall asked for and obtained from this Government an embargo on the shipment of combat matériel into China. That embargo lasted from the time it was imposed in '46, the exact date I do not have with me—

Senator Brewster. You don't have that date?

Secretary Acheson. I have it here. We will look it up and put it in in a minute—until May 1947. During that time the Nationalists were winning the battles, they won the fights they had, they occupied the cities, but they immobilized themselves.

Need for Reform in China

We have talked from time to time here about the great necessity for reform in China. General Marshall, during his mission to China, stressed that over and over again with the Generalissimo, pointing out that the whole possibility of any kind of armed action against the Communists must at last rest upon a belief in the country and their own belief that they had something which was worth fighting for, and was progressive and good, and that if we did not have reform in China, we were never going to get this spirit which was necessary to fight and defeat the Communists.

After General Marshall returned, in the summer of 1947, the President, on the recommendation of General Marshall, sent General Wedemeyer to China on a fact-finding mission. General Wedemeyer, before he left, stressed again, as he had in

1945, the great importance and the necessity for reform.

He said before he left China for the United States:

To regain and maintain the confidence of the people, the Central Government will have to effect immediately drastic and far-reaching political and economic reforms. Promises will no longer suffice. Performance is absolutely necessary. It should be accepted that military force in itself will not eliminate communism.

General Wedemeyer went to China and returned. He made recommendations, which are printed in the White Paper, in which he recommended assistance of economic and military equipment for a 5-year period, which would require Congressional authorization. Although his actual recommendations do not call for a grant of military aid, it is possible to read that in. He does talk about the desirability of that.

However, General Wedemeyer recognized the desirability and importance of avoiding direct United States involvement in the civil war in China by stating:

Although advice indicated above [that is, technical military advice] does provide advice indirectly to tactical force, it should be carried on outside operational areas to prevent the criticism that American personnel are actively engaged in fratricidal warfare.

There are other recommendations in the Wedemeyer report which I shall not dwell upon at the present time. We are now directing our attention to the aid part of it.

Consideration of Aid to China

The Secretary of State, General Marshall, then had prepared, and with the approval of the President, sent to Congress a recommendation for aid to China. He made before the Foreign Relations Committee a very frank statement of the problems facing the United States Government in considering aid to China.

He made it clear that there were steps which had to be taken and could only be taken by the Chinese Government, which were essential to meet the Communist threat.

And, he took the position strongly that the United States Government had to be extremely careful that it did not commit itself to a policy involving the absorption of its resources to an unpredictable extent by assuming a direct responsibility for the civil war in China, and for the Chinese economy.

He also pointed out that we must be prepared to face the possibility that the Chinese Government might not be able to maintain itself against the Chinese Communist forces.

That was stated quite clearly by General Marshall. In fact, he said:

An attempt to underwrite the Chinese economy and the Chinese Government's military efforts will result in a burden on the United States economy and a military

responsibility which I cannot recommend as a course of action for this Government.

Now, the program of aid which General Marshall presented was a program of 570 million dollars in economic assistance over a 15-month period. He pointed out that the experience gained in the program would throw light on the possibilities of future programs.

The program was sufficient in size, it was thought, to free the major portion of the Chinese Government's own foreign exchange assets for the purchase of such military supplies, from foreign sources, as it might need.

It was not recommended that we should have military advisers in combat areas.

It was not recommended that we should take measures of military aid which would lead to United States military intervention in China or direct involvement in the civil war.

Now, this question was very carefully considered in the Executive branch, at a meeting in June 1948 attended by Secretary Marshall, Secretary of the Army Royall, General Bradley and General Wedemeyer, and the decision which I have just spoken of was taken.

There was already a United States military advisory group in China that had been established in 1946, and in 1947 the commanding officer of this group had been authorized to give advice on a confidential basis to the Generalissimo, advice of a strategic nature, but the United States was not willing to assume responsibility for the strategic direction of the war.

General Marshall in a message to General Barr pointed out one reason why. He said:

I think you will agree that implications of our accepting that responsibility would be very far reaching and grave, and that such responsibility is in logic inseparable from the authority to make it effective. Whatever the Generalissimo may feel moved to say with respect to his willingness to delegate necessary powers to Americans, I know from my own experience that advice is always listened to very politely but not infrequently ignored when deemed unpalatable.

Therefore we did not take responsibility for the strategic direction of the war, nor did we recommend that American officers should be with troops in combat areas.

This recommendation was considered by the Eightieth Congress. The Eightieth Congress—and I shall not go through a whole long story—the Senate bill reduced the period of time from 15 months to 12 months. It reduced, split the appropriations and recommended 338 million dollars for economic aid and 125 million dollars as a special grant to be used at the discretion of the Chinese Government.

The debate indicates that the Chinese Government would probably use this 125 million dollars for military aid. In the course of the legislative history, the House put in a provision authorizing military advice on the so-called Greek model, that

is having officers with troops in combat areas and strategic advice. That was stricken out by the Senate, and in speaking about it Senator Vandenberg said:

As in the case of Greece and Turkey, your committee recognizes that military aid is necessary in order to make economic aid effective. It proposes to make military supplies available at China's option. Your Committee believes that as a matter of elementary prudence that this process must be completely clear of any implication that we are underwriting the military campaign of the Nationalist Government.

And, as I say, the House provision was stricken out.

That was agreed to in conference, and the bill was passed chiefly as written by the Senate.

I said that the bill authorized 338 million dollars for economic aid. However, when it came to the appropriation process, Congress only appropriated 275 million dollars for economic aid and 125 million dollars for military aid. So a total was actually made available by the Congress of 400 million dollars as against 570 million dollars requested.

I shall not go in detail through the campaigns of 1947 more than I have already done. The real collapse of the government in a military way began in the latter part of 1948. The first large-scale defection and collapse occurred in September 1948 with the fall of Tsinan, where government forces without any effort at all went over to the other side and surrendered with all their matériel.

The *United States Army Intelligence Review of Military Developments* in 1948, in January 1949, sums it up this way:

The Nationalists entered 1948 with an estimated strength of 2,723,000 troops. Recruitment and replacement of combat losses kept this figure constant through mid-September. By February 1, 1949, however, heavy losses had reduced Nationalist strength to a million and a half, of which approximately 500,000 are service troops. This represents a reduction of 45 percent of the Nationalist Government's total strength in a 4½-month period.

Communist strength, estimated at 1,150,000 a year ago, has mounted to 1,622,000, virtually all combat effectives. Whereas the Nationalists began 1948 with almost a 3 to 1 numerical superiority, the Communist forces now outnumber the total Nationalist strength and have achieved better than a 1½ to 1 superiority in combat effectives.

The events of the last year, and more specifically those of the last 4½ months, have resulted in such overwhelming losses to the National Government that, acting alone, its military position has declined beyond possible recoupment.

On the other hand, these same events have so enhanced the position and capabilities of the Communists that they are now capable of achieving a complete military victory over the Communist forces.

Chairman Russell. Nationalist forces.

Secretary Acheson. I mean Nationalist forces.

In mid-November, 1948, General Barr, who was the head of the military mission to China, reported to the Department of the Army:

I am convinced that the military situation has deteriorated to the point where only the active participation of United States troops could effect a remedy. No battle

has been lost since my arrival due to lack of ammunition or equipment. Their military debacles, in my opinion, can all be attributed to the world's worst leadership and many other morale-destroying factors that led to a complete loss of the will to fight.

In another report early in 1949, he explained some of the causes for the National Government negotiations for the cessation of hostilities but he defeats. He says the Government committed its first politico-military blunder by concentrating on the military reoccupation of former Japanese-held areas. It gave very little consideration to regional sentiments or the creation of efficient local administrations. Its strategy was burdened by an unsound strategy conceived by a politically influenced and militarily inept high command.

Throughout the structure and machinery of the National Government there are interlocking ties of interests, family, financial and political. No Chinese, no matter how efficient, can hope for a position of authority because he is the best qualified man. He must have other backing. In too many cases, such backing was the support and loyalty of the Generalissimo and his army comrades, which kept them in posts of responsibility regardless of their qualifications. The direct result has been the unsound strategy and faulty tactics of the Nationalists in their fight against the Communists.

Senator Wiley. Whose report was that?

Secretary Acheson. That is General Barr, United States Army.

By the end of 1948 the struggle in North China had virtually ended with the complete collapse of the Nationalist armies. Eighty percent of all the matériel which we had furnished, both during the war and after, to the National Government, was lost; and 75 percent of that is estimated to have been captured by the Communists.³

One reason for this large capture, General Barr points out, when he says that the Chinese Nationalist Government never destroyed any—the troops never destroyed any of the matériel, when they were about to surrender or run.

He says,

The Chinese seemed inherently unable to destroy anything of value.

Summary of U. S. Policy in China

Now, at the very end of my remarks here, I briefly sum up some of the things, material and otherwise, which the United States did in aid of its policy in China.

Speaking, first, of things on which it is impossible to put a dollar value, first, is the aid rendered by the United States forces in China in planning and in carrying out the movement of the Chinese Government forces into the areas occupied by the Japanese.

³ Exclusive of ammunition.

Second, is the evacuation of the Japanese troops from those areas.

Third, is the aid rendered by the United States Marines in North China; in occupying key areas and maintaining control for the government of essential railway lines until the government was able to take over.

Fourth, the aid provided by the United States Military Advisory Group.

Apart from this, the United States Government, in the period from VJ-Day until early 1949, authorized grants and credits to China totaling approximately 2 billion dollars, of which approximately a billion, six, were grants, 4 hundred million were on credit terms.

This total is divided almost equally between military and economic aid. The amounts do not include United States surplus property, except where the sales were on credit terms.

Surplus property, with a total estimated procurement cost of over a billion dollars, has been sold to China for the agreed realization to the United States of 230 million dollars, of which 95 million were on credit terms.

By the spring of 1949, the military position of the Chinese Government collapsed to the point where the Chinese Communists controlled the major centers of population, and railways from Manchuria south to the Yangtze.

The military collapse of the Chinese Government had, for the most part, been the consequence of inept political and military leadership, and a lack of the will to fight on the part of its armies, rather than inadequate military supplies.

It was at that time the considered judgment of responsible United States Government observers in China that only the extension of unlimited American economic and military aid involving the use of our own troops and operations which might require the extensive control of Chinese Government operations would enable the Nationalist Government to maintain a foothold in South China.

It was believed that United States involvement in Chinese civil war under the existing conditions would be clearly contrary to American interests.

As the last note of this tragic story, I should like to read you the message of the Acting President of China, General Li Tsung-jen.

Senator Wiley. What is the date?

Secretary Acheson. May 5, 1949, in a letter which he addressed to President Truman. He says:

This policy—[he had described our help to China during the war, and then he had discussed our aid to China after the war as I have described it to you]—This policy of friendly assistance was continued when some years ago General Marshall under instructions from your good self took up the difficult task of mediation in our conflict with the Chinese Communists to which he devoted painstaking effort. All this work was unfortunately rendered fruitless by the lack of sincerity on the part of both the then government and the Chinese Communists.

In spite of this your country continued to extend its aid to our Government. It is regrettable that owing to the failure of our then government to make judicious use of this aid and to bring about appropriate political, economic and military reforms, your assistance has not produced the desired effect. To this failure is attributable the present predicament in which our country finds itself.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Fifth Session of the General Conference of UNESCO, Florence, Italy, May 22-June 17, 1950. International Organization and Conference Series IV; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 13. Pub. 4050. 136 pp. 35¢

Report of the United States delegation with selected documents.

Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in Ecuador. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2147. Pub. 4063. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ecuador—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Quito September 15, 1950; entered into force September 20, 1950; operative retroactively from June 30, 1950.

Air Service: Facilities at Tan-Son-Nhut Airport in Indochina. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2150. Pub. 4067. 8 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and France—Signed at Saigon October 19, 1948; entered into force October 19, 1948.

Agricultural Mission in Nicaragua. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2152. Pub. 4071. 8 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Nicaragua—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Managua January 25 and February 1, 1950; entered into force February 1, 1950.

Food Production: Cooperative Program in Haiti. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2153. Pub. 4072. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Haiti modifying agreement of August 28, 1944, as modified and extended—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Port-au-Prince June 30, 1949; entered into force June 30, 1949.

Food Production: Cooperative Program in Haiti. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2154. Pub. 4073. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Haiti—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Port-au-Prince September 18 and 27, 1950; entered into force September 29, 1950; operative retroactively from June 30, 1950.

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Latin America's Role in Thinking Ahead for Business

by Edward G. Miller, Jr.

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Few people in this country realize the importance of Latin America to United States business as a whole. Last year 35 percent of our imports came from Latin America and 27 percent of all United States exports went to Latin America. These exports totaled approximately 2.7 billion dollars, which was very nearly as much as our total of exports to Europe. United States exports to Western Europe in 1950 were valued at roughly 2.9 billion dollars, just 210 million dollars more than our Latin American exports, and nearly 2 billion dollars of United States trans-Atlantic exports were paid for out of Marshall Plan funds.

Similarly, Latin America is extremely important as a field for United States foreign investment. At the end of the year 1949, United States private investment in Latin America totaled over 5.8 billion dollars. Dollar investments have flowed to Latin America since the war at an unprecedented rate. In the 3 years from 1947 through 1949, 1.7 billion dollars was added to the total of private United States investment in Latin America. The 1950 year end figures are not yet complete, but it is safe to say we now have well over 6 billion dollars invested in Latin America. In comparison, private American investment outside the Western Hemisphere totals something over 7 billion dollars.

The scope of United States economic involvement in Latin America becomes particularly impressive when it is realized that the population of Latin America represents less than 7 percent of the population of the world, having recently, like the United States population, passed the 150 million mark.

Even more impressive is the fact that not only is the population comparatively small to have assumed such an important role for United States business, but that this importance has been attained despite the fact that these countries are still, in view of their great potential, only on the threshold of their industrial development. For

example, in 1949, United States national income was nine times as great as the combined incomes of all of the Latin American nations.

Comparing the United States and Mexico, for example, the Mexican per capita income was the equivalent of \$121 when United States per capita income was \$1,453, in 1949. There were 5.5 passenger cars in Mexico per thousand population in 1949. There were 243 per thousand in the United States.

But perhaps the most significant aspect of what we have been discussing from the standpoint of United States business for the future is that Latin America is not static; that economic growth is proceeding at a very rapid pace even in relation to this country. To my mind, this fact—that Latin America is developing at a fast pace—is the main fact in thinking ahead for business. In the case of Mexican automobiles, for instance, according to Mexican Government statistics, motor vehicle registrations have climbed 140 percent since 1937. Registrations have increased 50 percent in the United States in the same period.

The last 20 years have brought tremendous economic growth in Latin America, and in many ways more progress has occurred during this period than in the preceding century, at least in regard to industrial and commercial development.

It is reasonable to assume that this rate of growth will be maintained in Latin America, provided always that the necessary imports of capital equipment will be forthcoming during the period of shortages imposed by the present emergency. I will go further and say that since development in itself promotes development, the rate of growth in Latin America should be even greater in the future, all other things being equal. A necessary consequence is that the standard of living of Latin America and the per capita purchasing power should continually increase in relation to United States levels. An important factor in this connection is the progressive development of efficient labor forces in these countries as new industries are created. And, of course, as we

¹ Address made before the Harvard Business School Association at Boston, Mass., on June 9 and released to the press on the same date.

all know from the history of this country, more growth means more opportunities.

A second fact to be remembered is that the growth which has occurred in Latin America is to a large extent the result of a factor which was not operative in the economic growth of the United States. In this country expansion of our economy has been fairly constant throughout our history and, except for periods of war and national emergency, has been a more or less "natural" process, individual initiative applied in an uncoordinated way to the development of resources. In Latin America there is no such record of steady growth. Rather, many of the economies were relatively static for a long time in regard to industrial development, the principal effort having been devoted to agriculture and real estate. In the last 20 years, in most countries, a radical change has occurred and industrial development has surged ahead suddenly. This surge has come about to an important degree by popular demand. The people in Latin America, as in other parts of the world, are not content with their lot and they are no longer apathetic about it. They want a greater share of the good things of life. They want their countries to be prosperous, to offer them greater opportunities for employment and broader horizons for their children.

These are pressures to which the governments of Latin America are subjected and, by and large, these governments have become increasingly responsive to the will of the people. I think they will become even more responsive in the future, for the critical problem for governments in many Latin American countries during the next few decades may well be whether or not living standards and social development will advance rapidly enough to keep discontent from boiling over into blind destruction or from being utilized by international communism for its own ruthless and antidemocratic ends.

Efforts Toward Economic Expansion

What can be seen now in many countries of the hemisphere are determined and conscious efforts to bring about economic expansion. In some cases, government agencies have been formed to cope with the problem, as in the case of the Chilean Development Corporation and the Mexican Nacional Financiera. In Puerto Rico, where the problem is the same as in the independent countries of Latin America, we have the notable example of Governor Munoz Marin's so-called "Operation Bootstrap," where the Government has not only taken direct action in stimulating industrial activity but has also sought to create the conditions which attract private capital investment from the United States.

It might be said parenthetically that our Government has seen fit on its own part to help economic expansion in Latin America through means appropriate for governmental activity. Our

programs of technical and economic cooperation through such agencies as the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, the Export-Import Bank, and the International Bank are too well known to be dealt with here. I shall only say that the activities of these institutions have been directed toward providing basic public services and participating in programs of basic development which in turn help promote private activity.

Recently our Government's efforts in the field of economic development have been subject to a searching review by a distinguished group of citizens under the chairmanship of Nelson Rockefeller. Their conclusions have been embodied in a report which, in substance, recommends a considerable intensification of this type of activity. The report also recommends new methods by which our Government can help stimulate the increased flow of private capital abroad. These include tax incentive measures, investment treaties, and limited guaranties by the Export-Import Bank of specific investment projects. These are all measures which have been receiving active study by our Government. A special value of the report is that it rationalizes the relative participation of public and private endeavor in the expansion of economic activity in underdeveloped areas.

There are, then, two main facts to be borne in mind in regard to the future in Latin America. First, that economic growth in this area has been proceeding rapidly and will probably continue even more rapidly; and, second, that this trend is in large measure the result of a new awakening and demand by the people for more economic activity.

Naturally, these trends are characterized by certain aspects which are not entirely in accord with classical doctrines of international economics. In a number of cases we have seen the creation of new industries which are economically unsound to the extent that they depend upon undue tariff protection or are uneconomic from the standpoint of accessibility of raw materials. There has been in some countries a tendency toward governmental ownership of industry, where, again, the results may be uneconomic from the standpoint of such indices as productivity per man-hour. In still other countries the climate may be hostile for the entrance of foreign capital. The people and the government of the country concerned may wish to reserve for themselves exclusively the task of developing their resources. There are numerous other problems of a similar nature which could be enumerated.

Attitude of U.S. Business

In considering the factors affecting private business in Latin America, what should be the attitude of United States business? First, of course, there is no question that there are tremendous opportunities in the hemisphere—opportunities

tunities for constructive assistance on the part of United States business in the sound development of the economy of these countries. On the other hand, the conditions under which foreign capital is going to be allowed to participate in these opportunities will depend upon the freely exercised sovereign will of the 20 independent countries which comprise this area of the free world. We in our Government, or you in business, may not approve of some of the economic theories and practices which we see in other countries. We may think they are unwise even from the standpoint of the long-range self-interest of the other country. We may deplore them in speeches and resolutions. We—and now I am speaking of the government alone—may do our best to bring about better understanding of our motives, of our views as to the functions of responsible capital investment in the modern world; we may and do try through representations in individual cases and through our efforts to negotiate economic treaties to bring about an improved climate for private activity. We have consistently pointed out that the problem of development is not one that can be solved by government activities, that true and balanced development can only happen by permitting full play to the forces of private initiative and skills, both domestic and foreign. We have emphasized, and we shall continue to emphasize that United States Government economic assistance can be more effectively brought to bear in countries where these conditions exist.

But I repeat: The terms and conditions under which foreign capital will be admitted into another country is up to that country. We as a government will most scrupulously respect the sovereign right of each juridically equal nation of the hemisphere to run its own affairs. We in the Department of State—as much as we may admire the achievements of individual enterprise—cannot undertake the functions of sponsors of United States capital investment. Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States is not out to impose its systems on other countries.

Therefore, it seems to me that the wisest attitude business can assume in thinking about investment in Latin America is to try to see things as they are and to work within the existing scheme of things. This may mean that business will stay entirely out of situations that are precarious. In other cases, it will mean putting up with certain difficulties of the kinds which I have enumerated, but I suppose that nowhere in the world are the conditions for business exactly what business would like to see, and that goes for the laws of our own Federal Union and its 48 component States.

This also means, I think, that the most effective contribution to a favorable climate for private investment is for American business, both here and abroad, to show that it represents the best system in the world—the best system not only from the standpoint of productivity but in the light of the

desire of people everywhere to get a better share of the good things of life. All business, in short, must prove itself. You and I believe that United States private enterprise is the best system, but it does not follow automatically that other people—people with different habits and traditions—will necessarily think as we do about this particular aspect of our national life. The only way that other people can be brought to believe in this system is for them to be convinced that it works, and that it works not only here but in their country, whatever it may be. How, specifically, can business prove itself in this way? There would be no point in my lecturing you, who have wider experience than I have in this field, so I suggest that the best guides are found in the records of the American enterprises which have had the greatest success in Latin America.

Almost without exception, if they have done well, they have abided by the rules and regulations of the other country. This may seem an obvious precept, almost too obvious to mention. However, real doubt from time to time is engendered abroad as to the willingness of American capital to live within the rules of the game in a particular country.

Secondly, the American interests which have been most esteemed and in general have been most fairly treated in Latin America are those which have shown a genuine concern for the general welfare of the other country. It seems to have been particularly, and understandably, difficult for Americans to see eye-to-eye with Latin American governments on what constitutes “general welfare” where government-sponsored development programs were under way. But to date nothing has been achieved by bucking the plans of a sovereign government. American enterprise has made great contributions to the development of national steel enterprises in Brazil and Chile, and in the latter over 150 American technicians, furnished by American companies, are now contributing to the welfare of Chile and to our own relations with that country. In Colombia, an American oil company whose concession has expired is assisting the Colombian Government to continue to operate the concession. These examples will go far to promote the interest of private enterprise as a whole.

In some cases great strides have been made by improving public relations of American enterprises in general and labor relations in particular. A number of American enterprises have decided they could no longer content themselves with the claim that they pay better wages than other countries. At this point, personnel management programs and similar devices prove to be very valuable aids to successful operation. The effort that is being put forth by certain American interests to apply in Latin America the labor-management procedures which we have developed here is, to my mind, the most worthwhile effort of all.

Fostering a Labor Policy Abroad

It would be well to bear in mind that the interests of capitalism and labor, far from being irreconcilable, are in the true sense of the word identical. One of the most eloquent statements of this case is by William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, who on October 13, 1950 said:

Communism has sought to make a bogey of capitalism by painting it as a system of exploitation and oppression, imposed on the many for the benefit of the few. They preach that capitalism is doomed, since it bears within it the seeds of its own destruction.

Trade unionism, on the other hand, has demonstrated to the world that there has never been anything wrong with capitalism that higher wages and shorter hours could not cure. It has shown that capitalism can mean more democracy, not less, and that it can bring material, cultural and social progress and improvement to the many rather than the few. Modern trade unionism is an outgrowth of industrial capitalism and has provided the mechanism whereby the fruits of capitalism have been distributed over an ever widening area of the populace. Far from being foredoomed, capitalism has thus borne within it the seeds of its own salvation. This is the revolutionary message that American labor is placing before the workers of the world today.

If, in their Latin American operations, United States business can foster that type of labor philosophy, we have no reason to fear for the future of free enterprise, both local and foreign, in Latin America. And it must be obvious to any one who has been in Latin America that American concerns, if they are given the chance and if they will, can speed the growth of democratic labor leadership. It is fortunately true that attention to labor relations and personnel problems is coming to be another characteristic of the United States concerns in Latin America which have the most promising future. They abide by local laws, they evidence a broader concern that the short-range welfare of their own enterprise, and they put into practice at least some of the lessons in labor-management relations which business has learned here at home.

There are other developments which I think we should hope will become characteristic. There are the number of cases in which United States enterprises are working very hard to develop responsible local management and to reduce the number of United States citizens occupying top managerial positions, as well as top technical positions. There are the signs of increasing interest in incentive and bonus plans, as well as private retirement plans along the lines of those which have been successful in this country.

Also, American enterprises abroad are becoming more and more aware of the advantages of stock participation on the part of citizens of the other country. The enlightened self-interest involved in this type of program is evident when it is realized that one of the principal obstacles to development in Latin America has been the unavailability of local risk capital. It is all too evident that one of the principal deterrents to economic progress

in other countries is a tendency to invest in real estate or family businesses and to expect a rate of return on capital investment far higher than our own investors and many times higher than equity investors expect here. It is encouraging, therefore, to see an American-owned public utility in Brazil currently financing part of the local currency costs of a major expansion program through sales of common stock to small investors who are served by the company.

Finally, American businessmen abroad are becoming more flexible and are learning increasingly to adjust to the requirements of the local scene and to the shifts which occur from time to time. They are becoming more farsighted and are learning to keep on the move.

In substance, the lesson which American business abroad is teaching us is that business abroad must act as part of the local community, not as an absentee-owned organization interested only in deriving profit, particularly not as an organization seeking hit-and-run profits from its enterprise. The entire scope of our relations with our neighbors is helped by such farsighted ventures as the Pan American School of Agriculture at Zamorano in Honduras which is supported by the United Fruit Company and the work of the Rockefeller Foundation in many countries of this hemisphere.

Developing a Mutual Confidence

I hope what I have said will not be understood as a Government spokesman urging American capital to go abroad or urging other countries to accept American capital. Private capital will move only of its own free will—that is, only if the investor finds that the risks in a particular situation are compensated by the opportunities over the long pull. There are still many opportunities for investment within the United States, which will naturally have a higher priority for the investor if the attractiveness of a situation outside of the country is less than the hazards with which that situation is encumbered.

In other words, while it is true that all United States business abroad must prove itself to other countries, by the same token the other countries must show a real understanding of the problems of business. In some countries, even those which allege a desire for foreign capital, and even where American private investment has made great contributions to the general welfare, the conditions do not exist which are essential to attract American investment away from the investment opportunities which this country still presents and will always present. So long as there is discrimination in foreign countries, so long as foreign companies are made the butt of local political maneuvers, there will naturally be skepticism in the business community of this country in regard to any country in which such practices exist. In these cases American capital will not go.

The problem of private capital working abroad is, finally, one which depends upon mutual confidence. In many countries, excellent progress has been made in establishing a climate favorable for private initiative. In some countries of the hemisphere, the requisite mutual confidence is today a reality. In others, it exists to a lesser extent. In some, it does not exist at all. In thinking ahead for business, the great challenge is to prove over the long pull that the countries having confidence in United States private investment are following the right approach from the standpoint of their own self-interest.

Relations With Bolivia Resumed

[Released to the press June 7]

The Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy of the United States in La Paz, Thomas J. Maleady, has been instructed to resume diplomatic relations with the Bolivian Government today.

This action is being taken in conformity with the desire of the United States to carry on normal diplomatic relations with the Bolivian Government, and in accordance with our information that the new Government there has established effective control over Bolivian territory and has given satisfactory indication of its intention to fulfill the international obligations of Bolivia.

Letters of Credence

Australia

The newly appointed Ambassador of Australia, P. C. Spender, K. C., presented his credentials to the President on June 8, 1951. For a text of the Ambassador's remarks and for a text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 497 of June 8.

Colombia

The newly appointed Ambassador of Colombia, Cipriano Jaramilio Restrepo presented his credentials to the President on June 5, 1951. For a text of the translation of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 476 of June 5.

Guatemala

The newly appointed Ambassador of Guatemala, Carlos H. Aldana Sandoval, presented his credentials to the President on June 4, 1951. For a text of the translation of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 469 of June 4.

Point 4 Agreement With Lebanon

On June 5 the Department of State announced that a Point 4 general agreement between the United States and Lebanon was signed on May 29 in Beirut. American Chargé d'Affaires John H. Bruins signed for the United States and Foreign Minister Husayn Uwayni for Lebanon. The agreement becomes effective upon ratification by the Chamber of Deputies of Lebanon.

In making the announcement, Technical Cooperation Administrator Henry G. Bennett explained that Point 4 is already at work in Lebanon under a project agreement, signed last February, for water-power and irrigation development of the Litani Valley, Dr. Bennett said,

The General Agreement paves the way for a broader program of economic development to further Lebanon's country-wide plans.

A mission of 10 specialists from the Bureau of Reclamation, Department of Interior, headed by Robert F. Herdman, of Pueblo, Colorado, arrived in Beirut last month. They are technicians in hydroelectric power, irrigation, and reclamation. They are cooperating with the Government of Lebanon in surveying the 125-mile-long valley of the Litani River.

This work is of prime importance in a country only 4,000 square miles in extent (about the size of Connecticut) but with a population of 1,200,000 persons. Irrigation, reclamation, and hydroelectric power together can do much to increase both agricultural and industrial production and raise the standard of living of the people.

The contract with the American University of Beirut means the establishment of a training center for students from all the Arab states. The trainees are chosen by their Governments and approved jointly by the University and the Point 4 mission in Beirut. They must agree to spend at least a year in the public service of their countries, after completing their courses in the University. The 118 students graduated yearly will form a nucleus of experts and of teachers for the further spreading of technical knowledge.

More than two-thirds of Lebanon's people live on farms, and agriculture forms the principal support of the country. Fruits and garden products are grown in quantities sufficient for the needs of the people. Large quantities of cereals must be imported. Development of the Litani River Valley would bring more land into production and would supply the power and irrigation for agriculture, industry, and sanitation work.

Dr. Bennett also announced the approval of project requests for personnel to operate four experimental laboratories to study improvement in the selection of seeds, protection of plants against disease and pests, increasing the number of pedigreed livestock, introduction of plants of economic value, augmenting the cooperative movement, and the preparation of agricultural statistics. American technicians will be assigned to Lebanon in the fields of soil chemistry, plant protection, fruit growing, farm mechanics, geophysics, agricultural cooperatives, marketing, animal and poultry husbandry, fisheries, forage crops, and land taxation.

Organizing for Peace

by Thomas D. Cabot

Director for International Security Affairs¹

It would have been pleasant to come to Tufts today with some thoughts of new horizons and to encourage those of you who are graduating to work at the exciting problems of pioneering a bold, new world. But you and I know that today's horizons are cloudy and the future uncertain. Those of you who will shortly enter the armed services need no reminder that our nation and the other free nations of the world face tremendous problems which take precedence over our usual activities.

I do not want to imply that the days of pioneering are over. Nor do I wish to suggest that the kind of civilization we have now is good enough, or that the members of this graduating class will have no opportunity to improve it. I only wish to point out that there are certain grim realities which we must face before we can turn our attention to anything else. Our first task is to save our existing civilization.

You are aware of the present threat. We are confronted by a nation which makes no secret of its intent to dominate the entire world or of its faith in the inevitability of its victory. This nation, in pursuing its aggressive designs, does not restrict itself to any single method or tactic. It uses every trick in the books. It maintains the largest army on earth and threatens its neighbors with military destruction, while at the same time posing as a champion of peace. It seeks to undermine existing governments by political subversion and economic sabotage. It appeals to the legitimate aspirations of peoples in all lands for an improvement in social conditions, for freedom from economic tyranny, for national independence—and, having gained their allegiance, promptly subjects them to a tyranny and slavery many times worse than that which they sought to escape. Finally, it has now proved that, when other methods fail and when the circumstances seem appropriate, it is willing to resort to direct military aggression.

A few years ago, in discussions of the Soviet

timetable, 1952 and 1953 were generally regarded as the critical years. These years once seemed a long way off; now they are upon us. The Soviets are quickening the pace of their aggressive preparations; they are growing more reckless, more impatient, less subtle. It is already later than we think.

Our Two Major Tasks

Today, we Americans and our friends and allies throughout the world face two fundamental tasks. The first is to achieve and maintain peace, if peace is at all possible. The second is simply to survive.

Let us not regard lightly our first aim—the aim of maintaining peace. The entire program of our Government has been built around the principle that peace is both possible and infinitely desirable. At the same time, let no one make the mistake of believing that the American people are afraid to fight, or that we will accept peace at any price. Our enemies, especially, should avoid the fatal error of believing that our desire to avoid the sacrifice and destruction of war means that we are “soft” or unwilling to defend ourselves.

Our desire for peace is based upon our fundamental respect for the well-being of individual human beings and our knowledge that another world war would be more devastating and more terrible than anything the world has ever known. We know that there are millions of men now living who will die if war is forced upon us. Cities will be utterly wiped from the face of the earth, families will be broken, children will be left homeless. These things may be unimportant to the men in the Kremlin, but they are important to us. Therefore, so long as there exists a reasonable hope for an honorable peace, we must make the necessary effort.

But, if the men in the Kremlin cannot be persuaded that war will be as destructive for them as for ourselves—if they insist on offering us no choice except war or surrender—we will not choose

¹ Address before Tufts College at Medford, Mass., on June 10 and released to the press on the same date.

surrender. Nor will we choose the gradual surrender, the creeping surrender, represented by appeasement, by giving up our allies, by permitting the piecemeal conquest of the free world. Our primary aim is peace, but an even more basic aim is survival. We pray that the Soviet imperialists will not force us to choose between these aims, but if they do, we have left no doubt as to what our choice will be.

The problem of survival today is at once military, economic, and political. It is a problem for science, for ethics, for religion, and even for the arts. It is a problem of Europe, of Asia, of Africa, of the Americas, and of every area of the globe. In hard, cold, practical terms, the problem of survival today is a problem of strength—the total strength of the free world against the total strength of the Soviet slave world.

Fortunately, it is possible for us to pursue our two major aims—peace and survival—along the same road. We have come to realize that strength is both the best deterrent to a Soviet war and the only remedy if war is forced upon us. Several experiences we have had in the last few years helped us to come to this conclusion. The struggle in Greece, for example. Communist-inspired guerrilla warfare in Greece came to an end when the Greek Government, with United States aid, showed the strength to put it down. The Berlin blockade is another example. When the Soviet rulers saw they could not defeat our airlift, the blockade was abandoned.

Strength, the Critical Factor

There is no question but that strength is the critical factor in the Kremlin's aggressive designs. The Soviet rulers well know that their ambitions to conquer the world depend on the strength they can commandeer, and they have used and will use every ruthless method and technique to get the resources and the manpower they think is necessary.

In the free world, we cannot build strength that way. We must meet the threat of a ruthless dictatorship through voluntary cooperative action consistent with our philosophy of freedom. We must seek new allies while retaining and strengthening those we have. It is a job which will require great skill and wisdom. Our social and economic policies must appeal to those who still control their own destiny. We must attract strength by the appeal of our moral position.

Strength which is voluntarily mustered, and supported by strong moral convictions among all the contributing peoples, is a kind of strength that no slave society can produce. The Soviet rulers, in forcing their subjects into aggressive action, destroy the most important component of strength—the will of the people. What we need to meet Soviet strength is a greater sense of urgency and more rapid action in the free world.

Soviet rulers and their puppets dominate about 800 million people—about one-third of the world population. That is their greatest potential strength. There are roughly half as many people in the United States and free Europe, but these 400-some million people are the most highly skilled and the most productive in the world.

You all know how we lead the world in industrial production and how we, in the United States, are rapidly expanding our basic capacity while, at the same time, converting a considerable part of it to producing the weapons needed for defense. Europe, too, is expanding its production. Together, we have a capacity that far overtops anything the Soviet world can produce.

Steel is one of the most important measures of strength in either a peacetime or a wartime economy. Last year, the United States and free Europe produced more than four times as much crude steel as the Soviet Union and its European satellites. The use of electric power is another good measure of strength. The United States and free Europe turned out five times as much electric energy last year as Russia and her satellites.

We are fortunate. The free world has many resources and skills at its disposal and it has the moral and spiritual values to hold firm and inspire support. The problem is to convert our great assets into the only kind of strength which is an effective deterrent to attack. It has not yet been possible, either here or in Europe, to use our steel, electric power, and industrial productivity of all sorts for tanks and planes and guns to the full extent needed to meet our present danger. Here in the United States, despite the lessons of Korea, we are, even today, devoting to defense a far smaller percentage of our abundant income than is extracted by the Soviets from the austere economy of Russia. In Western Europe, productive capacity has been devoted to rehabilitation from the disasters of the last war and to building a viable economy. Now with our Marshall Plan aid skillfully administered, the people of free Europe have resolutely rebuilt their industries, and production already exceeds that of prewar times. But this capacity must and can be converted in larger part to the production of weapons needed for rearmament.

In the same way, the peoples of Europe have undertaken to convert their human and moral resources into active and effective armed forces. We know that they can do this. Prior to 1939, the countries west of the iron curtain had raised and equipped armies considerably larger than those now contemplated for its defense, and had done so without outside help and without destroying the economic foundations of their societies. I have little doubt that they could do the same today, again without outside help, provided they were assured of having enough time to complete the task.

The Element of Time

But time is the key problem. During the course of World War II, the armies of many free European countries almost ceased to exist, making it necessary to rebuild them from scratch. Moreover, the economic devastation of the war and the occupation, and the slow and painful process of economic recovery, made it extremely difficult for these countries to initiate an adequate rearmament program. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, disregarding all human values and giving full priority to erecting a mighty military machine on the foundations of slave labor, gained an enormous and almost overwhelming military advantage.

It is clear, therefore, why the free peoples of Europe need our help. Given time, there can be no doubt that these peoples can defend themselves. It is our task to help them get started—to use our dollars to buy the precious time they need. Once the European defense effort is fully under way, we can expect ever greater reliance on their own resources and facilities, and less and less dependence on United States aid.

From a purely selfish standpoint, this is the cheapest and perhaps the only way that we Americans can protect ourselves. This does not mean that we expect the Europeans to fight our battles for us, any more than it means that we propose to fight the Europeans' battles for them. It means simply that we have recognized our mutual dependence and realize that it is good business on our part to help the free Europeans develop the strength to defend themselves. To give the needed impetus and to avoid the long disheartening delay which Europe would have to face if it attempted its own rearmament without our help, we have been sending quantities of defense weapons, equipment, and supplies across the Atlantic during the past year, and the need for this mutual defense aid during the coming year is frankly as great. The bulk of Europe's need right now is for this kind of assistance—tanks and guns and weapons and supplies. But I do not want to underestimate the need also for spiritual and moral help. We all have to know that we can depend on each other, that we are in this together, and that we have equal determination to see it through.

Other areas, too, need our help. In Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, people have lived for centuries amidst great natural riches of the earth, and yet lived in poverty and disease, in a vicious circle of circumstances which did not allow them to benefit from their resources. In the last few years, a great change has come over many of these areas. New means of communication have awakened people to new possibilities. Many of them have won political independence, and have established governments determined to win a new life for their peoples. In many of these areas, they do not have the technical wherewithal to break through the circle that has claimed them for

so long. They need technical help. They need the technical knowledge that the United States can supply.

How To Withstand Communist Pressure

Given a chance, there is every reason to believe that these people can conquer their problems and become stable and secure members of the free world, contributing to its strength and to its security. The Soviet rulers have their eyes on these areas, and on the manpower and strategic resources they would gain through capturing them. They are putting pressure on them now, and they will continue to put pressure on them to try to force them into the Soviet world. The Soviet rulers would like to convince the people of Asia and the Near East that the better life they want will flow from Communist control. They are using every propaganda device to put this lie across. They see in Asia, in the Near East, and in Africa a means to multiply their power.

To withstand the Communist pressure, these areas need support. The particular problems vary from area to area. In some places, military aid is needed. Technical aid is needed almost everywhere. Some economic aid is needed. They need this help to make their efforts toward economic development successful, and only if they are successful in their quest for independence and economic security will they become stable components of a free society. Our own security depends on the success they meet.

With Latin America, we have long had cooperative arrangements to build the hemispheric solidarity and friendship that insure mutual security; and we have been able to see the effects of the technical aid we have given. Over a period of years, the Latin American governments have made a great deal of progress in establishing new economic standards and new production levels. They still have many stubborn problems. They still need technical and economic aid. They still have problems of poverty, education, health and social services. And they have a great deal to do in building their defense. We are close neighbors—and our security is very much interdependent. Where we can help them, we are only helping ourselves.

The problems of these people all over the world are our problems as well as theirs. Where they fail to solve them, the free world loses strength; and wherever and whenever the free world loses strength, the men in the Kremlin move to accomplish their ambitions.

We cannot afford to go it alone. The path of isolation leads neither to peace nor to victory. It leads at best to a bleak existence in a storm cellar under attack by an insuperable power bent on world domination. We know that Russia prefers to obtain its aims without war. At the same time, we know that Russia will risk war if war appears to offer the best chance of success, and we know

that its willingness to take this risk may increase now that our monopoly of atomic weapons is ended. If, while there is still time, we can create new deterrents, barriers to easy expansion, we can keep the balance of power and expect peace and a reasonable degree of prosperity.

Coordinating the Aid Programs

An understanding of our danger has led to the establishment of the Marshall Plan, our participation in the North Atlantic Treaty, our Mutual Defense Assistance Program, and the Point 4 Program for technical assistance.

Because of the interdependence of these programs, and because of the need for coordination and flexibility in them, we are now proposing to combine our military, economic, and technical aid into one program—a Mutual Security Program—for the coming year. Under this proposed program, we would provide to other free nations the weapons, materials, economic and technical help they need. The Mutual Security Program is not new. It is essentially a continuation of the kind of help we have already given, but it coordinates our efforts and adapts them to the global problem. It includes provisions for strengthening our participation in the United Nations so that that organization can continue to work for collective security.

The Mutual Security Program is a frank recognition of the fact that our problem of survival involves every area of the world and involves the building of integrated economic, military, political, and moral strength.

The estimated cost of the program during the next year is 8½ billion dollars. This is an amount that is economical in comparison to what the taxpayers of the United States would have to spend if we ignored the need now. It is actually an investment in the resources and resourcefulness of other peoples, from which the dividends will be eminently worthwhile. It means that Americans will be somewhat more restricted in spending and in consumption of civilian goods, but we will still be living on a far higher standard than any other peoples in the world. In terms of the security we get, it is as solid an investment as the American people can make and if it protects our right to live the way we choose, its true value will be immeasurable.

I hope that these sober thoughts I am leaving with you do not prove discouraging. There is every reason to be encouraged when a dangerous situation is being met with boldness and courage. We have shown a capacity for extraordinary boldness and courage in meeting the dangers that have come before. I am confident the American people will show the same strength again. There is something about the way of life we have chosen that gives us the initiative and the enterprise to survive the pitfalls of the dynamic world in which we live.

Korean Envoy Presents Credentials

[Released to the press June 6]

The translation of the remarks of the newly appointed Ambassador of Korea, Dr. You Chan Yang, upon the occasion of the presentation of his letter of credence follows.

MR. PRESIDENT: It is my great pleasure to deliver into your hands this letter of credence of the President of the Republic of Korea, Dr. Syngman Rhee, accrediting me as Korean Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America.

This ceremony today is further evidence of the bonds of sympathy and understanding existing between our two countries.

I come to you, Mr. President, from my embattled country where American troops and other forces of the United Nations are engaged with my countrymen, in resistance to the common foe of all free mankind—armed Communist aggression.

The people of Korea and the Government of Korea are proud to testify to the great debt they owe the people of the United States and you, sir, their President. For it was your inspired leadership which summoned the United Nations to assist the Republic of Korea in repelling the lawless Communist invader and brought the free world to a consciousness of the danger confronting it.

Since then, it also has been your leadership and farsighted statesmanship which has produced the mobilization of this nation's resources and the rearming of the free world for defense and the insurance of peace. The Republic of Korea is anxious to play its full part in this program and my Government feels it can make a most substantial contribution if adequate arms or the manufacturing means thereof are made available to it.

Please be assured, Mr. President, of our desire to cooperate with your great people and Government to the fullest extent in your proclaimed aim to preserve and protect liberty and justice and democracy.

The President's reply to the remarks of the Ambassador of Korea follows.

MR. AMBASSADOR: It is with sincere pleasure that I accept from you, the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Republic of Korea to the United States, this Letter of Credence from your President, Dr. Syngman Rhee.

This ceremony is indeed evidence of the continuing and lasting friendship which exists between our two countries. The cementing of the bonds of this friendship and understanding has been one of the most gratifying of the milestones marking the road to the solidarity of the free world.

Mindful of its own history and traditions of

liberty, the United States of America has been deeply impressed by the determination of the Korean people to fulfill their aspirations to unity and independence. The many nations throughout the world which have sought the welfare of your country were greatly heartened by the progress made by the Korean people under a government of their own choosing. This very progress represented to Communist imperialism a threat to its program for the domination of Asia and undoubtedly influenced its decision to strike without warning at the very existence of the Korean nation.

The response of your countrymen to this aggression at once provided clear proof of their dedication to the defense of those high principles upon which the Republic of Korea has been founded and evoked an echoing and immediate response within the United Nations. The world will long remember what is happening in your country, and those who, anywhere, now struggle under oppression cannot fail to find hope and inspiration in the example of Korea.

United by the ties of a common understanding and a common purpose, I am confident that our two nations, together with the other freedom-loving peoples, will attain for Korea that peace with justice to which we are all dedicated and for which we fight. The American people are not unmindful of the incalculable hardships and suffering being endured by the Korean nation in its struggle for survival. They are both anxious and willing to assist in the alleviation of this suffering and in repairing the ravages of this cruel war.

On behalf of the people and the Government of the United States, may I convey to you, Mr. Ambassador, my deep appreciation for the expressions of understanding and friendship which you so generously have brought to me from the Korean people and their Government. I offer my sincere good wishes for your success in the performance of the important mission which has been entrusted to you. You may be assured that the Government of the United States and its officials are prepared to cooperate with you in every way.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2116, May 4; S/2128, May 8; S/2129, May 8; S/2133, May 8; S/2134, May 2; S/2144, May 10; S/2146, May 11; S/2147, May 14; S/2149, May 15; S/2154, May 17; S/2155, May 17; S/2156, May 18; S/2159, May 21; S/2160, May 21; S/2162, May 22; S/2163, May 22; S/2165, May 23; S/2166, May 23; S/2169, May 24.

Korean Memorial Day Observed for U.N. War Dead

On May 31, the United Nations Department of Public Information announced that the following information has been received from the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) at Tokyo.

Men of the United Nations forces who lost their lives in Korea in the fight against aggression were honored on May 30 in a Memorial Day service at a rain-drenched United Nations cemetery near Pusan.

Lt. Gen. John B. Coulter, newly appointed personal representative to UNCURK of the Commander in Chief of United Nations forces, spoke briefly in memory of fallen United Nations fighting men and placed a wreath before an American flagstaff directly behind a United Nations flag. Ambassador A. H. C. Gieben of the Netherlands, UNCURK Chairman, and Andrew Cordier on behalf of the United Nations Secretary-General, placed wreaths at a United States honor plot in the 15-country cemetery. Mr. Cordier, Executive Assistant to Secretary-General Trygve Lie, and Dragoslav Protitch, Principal Director of United Nations Department of Security Council Affairs, are visiting Korea as part of their tour of United Nations missions in the field.

Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea, American Ambassador John Muccio, and representatives of all United Nations army, navy, and air units also attended the military ceremony which closed when taps were sounded by two army buglers and echoed back by others at the far end of the cemetery.

Cambodian Minister Arrives in U.S.

The first Cambodian Minister to the United States, Nong Kimny, arrived in Washington on June 4. The Minister made the following remarks:

I wish to express the joy which I feel upon my arrival in Washington where I shall have the pleasure and duty to establish for the first time a Legation of the Royal Government of Cambodia in the United States of America.

I wish to thank the Department of State for the cordial welcome which it has accorded me upon arrival on American soil. I thank also the French missions at New York and Washington for their expressions of courtesy.

In such an atmosphere of confidence and friendship my mission can begin only in a most favorable manner. Independent Cambodia now entering into the family of nations, desires the peace and security which will permit, thanks to American economic and military assistance, as well as to the support of France and the French Union, the improvement of her national economy and the consolidation of her independence.

Designated as first Minister Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Cambodia at Washington, I feel honored indeed, and will do all in my power to serve the cause of friendship between Cambodia and the United States.

"Amerika" Popularity of Concern to U.S.S.R.

[Released to the press June 9]

Recent Soviet press attacks on the Department of State's Russian-language magazine *Amerika* are new evidence of its strong appeal for the Soviet people. Assistant Secretary Edward W. Barrett said today,

The Soviet articles—two within the last week—offer proof the magazine is continuing to make itself felt among Soviet peoples and that the Kremlin considers it necessary to counteract the true picture of the United States presented in *Amerika*.

These attacks merely corroborate a fact already proved by Soviet obstruction to *Amerika's* distribution—that the Soviet peoples want to read *Amerika*, but the Politburo does not want them to.

The attacks in question were a half-page article June 4 in *Pravda*, the leading newspaper of the Soviet Union, and a three-quarter page attack in the *Literary Gazette* on June 2. These attacks centered on a recent *Amerika* magazine lead article on wages and prices in the United States which was planned by the magazine's staff and the United States Embassy in Moscow to correct Soviet misconceptions about life in the United States.

The American Embassy in Moscow has now been requested to communicate with the Soviet distribution agency, saying it is obvious that the reading public in the U.S.S.R. would welcome a wider opportunity to see the magazine and to judge for themselves the accuracy of such criticisms as those in *Pravda* and the *Literary Gazette*.

On this basis, the Department is again urging the distributor to live up to its clear obligation and distribute the full 50,000 copies of each issue as called for by the existing agreement.

The *Amerika* article attacked by the Soviet Press appeared in issue No. 46. Titled "Wages and Prices in the United States, 1939-1950," the article emphasized that the average standard of living in the United States has risen 40 percent since the beginning of World War II.

The magazine said that perhaps the most striking feature of this new prosperity is that it is more widely and evenly shared than ever before and that there are fewer rich, fewer poor, and more people in the middle. This in turn has broadened mass markets, thus giving a new sta-

bility and strength to the economic system of the United States.

Charts developed by the magazine's art staff and based primarily on surveys by the United States Departments of Commerce and Labor show the relative movement of wages and prices from 1939 to 1950; number of families in the different income groups; growth of mass luxury income, as evidenced by increased consumption of such articles as automobiles, refrigerators, and television sets.

In their efforts to counteract this picture, the Soviet critics resorted to such extreme assertions as the following from *Pravda*:

Almost three-quarters of the population of the United States constitute indigent masses who are either starving or under threat of starvation . . .

In a similar vein, the *Literary Gazette* declared:

Seventy percent of all Americans are deprived of minimum living standards.

The *Pravda* article also stated that *Amerika* gives readers "America in saccharine syrup" which causes only "laughter and nausea," and the *Literary Gazette* stated that "from a mile away it smells of the rottenness of an unpardonable lie."

Pravda's leading critic, David Zaslavsky, called *Amerika* "miserable" and accused it of telling fairly tales of wages and prices to the Soviet people who, he says, "know no poverty or unemployment, but only grandiose peaceful construction."

The current attack on the magazine is regarded by the Department as a part of the campaign by which the Soviets are endeavoring to "jam" the magazine as well as VOA broadcasts to the U.S.S.R. The fact that the Department has succeeded since 1945 in distributing this official medium of American information in the Soviet Union is the result of the persistent efforts of three successive United States Ambassadors to Moscow. The original agreement to distribute 10,000 copies of a United States Russian-language publication in the U.S.S.R. was the result of negotiations carried on by Ambassador Harriman with the then Foreign Minister Molotov in 1944. Two years later Ambassador W. Bedell Smith reopened ne-

gotiations and gained a commitment from the Soviet Government to distribute 50,000 copies.

Since its inception, the magazine has enjoyed a wide popularity with Soviet readers. Even individual pages with color illustrations sold for as much as a dollar.

This popularity is obviously a source of concern to the Soviet authorities. But until 1950 official attacks on the magazine were limited to occasional press comments. In January 1950, however, the Soviet authorities made a direct move toward strangling the magazine. Although the distributor had regularly reported for 5 years previously that *Amerika* had sold out every issue, notification was received that "sales had dropped" from 50,000 copies per month to approximately 25,000, and that henceforth "unsold" copies would be returned to the United States Embassy in Moscow.

Although the Soviet "jamming" of distribution of *Amerika* has thus reduced its distribution, the Department is standing firm on its agreement with the Soviet Government and, accordingly, is con-

tinuing to deliver 50,000 copies a month to the Soviet distributor.

The Department is doing this because it believes it can insist on observance of the agreement only if it is delivering the full quota called for by the agreement and because a reduction in the number delivered would inevitably result in a reduction in the number offered for sale.

Returned copies are not wasted, but are utilized to reach the large Russian-reading groups in other areas of the world, such as Germany, Austria, etc.

The present circulation of 25,000 surpasses, of course, *Amerika's* original distribution of 10,000 copies. Even at the latter figure the magazine, as the sole United States publication directed to the Soviet people, was considered very valuable, since it reached at least 100,000 Soviet readers (estimates vary from 10 to 20 readers per copy). But the Department will continue to press for a restoration of the long-established figure of 50,000 copies distributed monthly.

Protest to U.S.S.R. on Killing of American Military Policeman

[Released to the press June 6]

The following is the text of a note protesting the recent killing of an American military policeman on duty in the international sector of Vienna by two unknown Soviet soldiers. The note was delivered to the Soviet Acting Foreign Minister, Valerian A. Zorin, by the United States Ambassador at Moscow, Admiral Alan G. Kirk, on June 4, 1951.

The Ambassador of the United States of America presents his compliments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, under instructions, has the honor to invite the attention of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the death of an American military policeman in Vienna on May 4, 1951.

Early on that date two United States military police were on patrol in the International District of Vienna in accordance with accepted quadripartite procedure for troops of the element exercising interallied command. When these police endeavored to establish identity and status of two armed Soviet soldiers behaving suspiciously, the latter opened fire without provocation and killed Corporal Paul J. Gresens. Immediately after the shooting the United States Provost Marshal attempted to report the tragedy to the Soviet Provost Marshal in an effort to expedite apprehension of the assailants and launch at once joint examination by the American and Soviet authorities of the evidence then available. Neither the Soviet member of the International Patrol nor the officer

on duty at the Soviet Kommandatura would assist in establishing this important liaison.

The proposal was advanced early the same day by the United States city commander to the Soviet city commander for a joint United States-Soviet investigation into the circumstances with the dual purpose of establishing responsibility for the occurrence and adopting measures to prevent possible repetition. This request, which was made in accordance with prior practice of interallied command, was reported by the United States High Commissioner to the Soviet High Commissioner on the same day, and subsequently reaffirmed by letter on May 7. In his reply to this communication May 9 Soviet High Commissioner rejected a proposal for a joint investigation on grounds that the Soviet soldiers themselves had been attacked without reason. The Soviet High Commissioner refused to participate in a joint investigation of the 11 witnesses who testified that the Soviet soldiers fired first. He refused to consider other available evidence or to make available for joint questioning the two Soviet soldiers involved in the killing.

After careful consideration of all available evidence the United States Government is convinced that Corp. Gresens was the victim of a sudden attack while engaged in the correct execution of his official duties. Refusal of the Soviet officials in Vienna to permit joint inquiry supports this conclusion.

The United States Government holds the members of the Soviet armed forces involved in the shooting responsible—either through deliberate intent or through negligence—of the death of Corporal Gresens and considers that the Soviet High Commissioner by his actions has condoned this crime. The United States Government requests, therefore, that the individual or individuals responsible be duly punished and that appropriate indemnification be made to the bereaved family of the slain soldier, as required by every consideration of humane treatment and customary usage between nations.

Consular Convention With U. K. Signed

[Released to the press on June 7]

On June 6, 1951, Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, and Sir Oliver Shewell Franks, British Ambassador in Washington, signed a consular convention, with an accompanying protocol of signature, between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

This convention and the accompanying protocol are intended to be substituted for the consular convention and protocol of signature signed at Washington on February 16, 1949, and the exchange of notes of October 12, 1949, relating to the nonapplication of the convention to Newfoundland and Newfoundland citizens. The convention, protocol, and exchange of notes of 1949 were transmitted to the United States Senate with the President's message of January 9, 1950, for advice and consent to ratification and were printed in a Senate document.¹

In view of questions which have arisen, since the convention and related documents of 1949 were transmitted to the Senate, concerning the interpretation and application of certain provisions of the convention, and in view of the fact that appropriate legislative action taken in a number of territories under British jurisdiction has made it possible to amend the protocol so as to delete therefrom the names of those territories, the Governments of the two countries considered the desirability of reformulating the convention and protocol and substituting the new instruments for the 1949 instruments.

The newly signed convention differs principally from the 1949 convention in that article 18 of the latter, relating to the authority of consular officers in connection with the administration of estates, is deleted. This entailed also the deletion of references to that article 18, including such references in article 2 (3) (b) and (c) and article 20.

¹ The text of the convention and the protocol are printed in *Documents and State Papers*, March-April 1949, p. 717; the report by the Secretary of State, in *BULLETIN* of Jan. 30, 1950, p. 175; also see, S. Ex. A, 81st Cong., 2d sess.

Apart from those deletions, the deletion of references to Newfoundland and Newfoundland citizens (thereby eliminating the necessity for the exchange of notes), and the deletion from the protocol of the names of certain territories under British jurisdiction, the only substantive changes are the deletion of paragraph (3) from article 5 of the convention as signed in 1949 and the deletion from article 29 (new art. 28) of the reference to provisions in the 1899 property convention between the United States and the United Kingdom.

With a view to facilitating action toward ratification, the newly signed convention and protocol will be submitted to the Senate as soon as possible for consideration in place of the 1949 instruments.

Procedure for Filing War Claims With Belgium

[Released to the press June 7]

American nationals seeking indemnification from Belgium for war damage to private property have until September 2, 1951, to file claims with the proper Belgian authorities.

On March 12, 1951, the United States and Belgium agreed to grant reciprocal treatment to the nationals of the two nations for indemnification of war damage.

The Department has been informed that the agreement was officially published in Brussels on June 2 and that a 90-day limit was set for the filing of claims.

Reciprocal national treatment is given for indemnification of war damage sustained by American nationals in Belgium and by Belgian nationals within the territorial limits of the United States, including Hawaii and Alaska. In order to receive Belgian national treatment, the interested persons must qualify as American nationals, both on the date of the war damage and on March 12, 1951.

The benefits are extended also to persons who have the status of American nationals only on one of the above-mentioned dates and that of a national either of Belgium or one of the other countries with which Belgium has concluded a reciprocal agreement concerning war damage on the other date.

The Department is informed that the Belgian Government has concluded reciprocal agreements with Great Britain and Canada.

American nationals seeking indemnification for war damage sustained in Belgium may file their claims with the Ministry of Reconstruction, 46 rue de la Loi, Brussels, Belgium. Appropriate forms for filing a claim may be obtained at any Belgian Consulate or the Ministry of Reconstruction. Belgian Consulates are located in New York, Chicago, Boston, San Francisco, New Orleans, and Dallas, Texas.

Persons who already have war damage claims on file with the Belgian authorities are not required to make new applications at this time.

Execution of Landsberg War Criminals

[Released to the press June 7]

Following is the text of a press release issued today by High Commissioner McCloy and General Handy on the execution of the seven war criminals at Landsberg prison.

United States High Commissioner John J. McCloy and Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Commander in Chief, EUSCOM, jointly announced today that the death sentences of seven war criminals in Landsberg prison have been carried out.

The war criminals were executed by hanging at Landsberg prison today between the hours of 12:00 midnight and 2:30 a.m. The sentences were carried out after appeals had been made to and denied by the United States federal courts.

Those executed were Oswald Pohl, Otto Ohlendorf, Erich Naumann, Paul Blobel, Werner Braune, Hans Schmidt, and George Schallermair.

These seven were the last prisoners at Landsberg prison under death sentence for war crimes and the carrying out of these sentences marks the last executions to be held at Landsberg for war crimes committed during the war.

Pohl, Ohlendorf, Naumann, Blobel, and Braune were sentenced by the military tribunals at Nürnberg established under the provisions of military government ordinance No. 7. Pohl was sentenced in the concentration camp case while the others were convicted in the Einsatzgruppen case. These sentences were reviewed by Mr. McCloy.

Schmidt and Schallermair were sentenced for war crimes by military government courts which were established by order of the Theater Commander in October 1946 and which functioned at Dachau. Their sentences were considered by General Handy.

Proclamation Signed on Results of Torquay Tariff Negotiations

On June 4, the Department of State announced that the President signed on June 2, 1951, a proclamation to give effect to the tariff negotiations undertaken by the United States at Torquay, England, from September 1950 to April 1951.¹ The results of these negotiations were made public on May 8, 1951.²

¹ Proc. 2929, 16 Fed. Reg. 5381.

² BULLETIN of May 21, 1951, p. 816.

Pursuant to procedure provided for in the proclamation the President also signed on June 2 a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury identifying concessions in schedule XX (U. S.) to the Torquay Protocol, which will become effective on June 6, 1951. These are for the most part the concessions negotiated with the Benelux Customs Union, Canada, France, and the Dominican Republic, all of which countries have undertaken to give effect to their concessions to us on June 6. Further letters will be issued giving effect to other concessions as and when other countries with which we negotiated such concessions undertake to give effect to the concessions they granted to the United States.

The proclamation and the letter indicate certain resultant adjustments in the list of Cuban products entitled to preferential treatment pursuant to the exclusive agreement of October 30, 1947, between the United States and Cuba. In addition, the proclamation provides that adjustments will be made, effective July 6, 1951, in parts of three concessions negotiated at Geneva in 1947, with the result that duties on the products involved will increase. These products are dyed stencil silk, dehydrated onion powder, and certain leather gloves. It announces that, on account of the provision in the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 preventing the conclusion of a trade agreement with the Philippines at this time, the United States has invoked article XXXV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to prevent the application of that agreement between the United States and the Philippines, which it is expected will accede to the agreement as a result of negotiations at Torquay.

Locust Threat in India To Receive Point 4 Aid

[Released to the press June 4]

The Governments of the United States and India signed an agreement on June 2, in New Delhi, for a cooperative locust-control campaign under the President's Point 4 Program.

Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Technical Cooperation Administrator, announced today that United States planes and experts are going to India to help repel an invasion of locusts threatening a 75,000 square mile area in Rajputana Province and neighboring states in northwest India. Two United States Air Force C-47 planes, now in Germany, and three Piper Cubs, now finishing a successful antilocust spraying operation in Iran, are being rushed to the threatened area, and will go into action there by July 1.

Two major food crops, jowar and bajra, are in danger. Both are types of millet, the staple food crop for this dry area of northern India. Large

crops of clover also lie in the path of the locusts. The loss of these crops would aggravate the food shortage conditions already prevalent in India.

Dr. Bennett said that United States Overseas Airlines, a private charter company, which supplied the planes and crews for spraying operations in Iran, under contract with the Technical Cooperation Administration, will undertake the same work in India.

William B. Mabey, leading Department of Agriculture expert on grasshopper control, now technical director of the Point 4 antilocust campaign in Iran, is expected to join the similar project in India early in June.

Ten tons of aldrin, the powerful new insecticide which was used with remarkable success in Iran, are being shipped to India. Two or three ounces of the poison, diluted with kerosene or Diesel fuel, are sufficient to spray an acre of land. Aldrin is produced by Julius Hyman and Company, Denver, and is distributed by the Shell Oil Company.

The Indian Government is providing ground crews, landing strips, and transportation for all members of the Point 4 spraying mission. It will cooperate in the project through the Indian Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

The operation is being carried out under the Point 4 general agreement signed by the United States and Indian Governments on December 28, 1950. Other Point 4 projects now underway in India are in the fields of food supply, agricultural research, mineral and water development, and child welfare.

Previous experience has shown that the Rajputana desert is a fertile breeding place of locusts. Its sandy soil and moisture conditions are ideal for locust breeding and egg laying. Swarms produced here during the summer monsoon rains fly from India to the Middle East where they multiply and migrate further.

Point 4 technicians will repeat the successful air-spraying methods employed in Iran where the same desert locust (*Schistocerca gregaria*) was destroyed. A Government of India observer in Iran will return to India to cooperate in the new program.

Locusts have caused great famines in India, China, and other countries. The locust, well-known in Biblical times, is still a periodic threat. At least 77 countries have been either permanently infested or frequently invaded. None of the five continents has escaped this threat.

Point 4 Leaders To Visit U. S.

[Released to the press June 8]

The Technical Cooperation Administration announced on June 8 the names of 15 leading citizens of India, Pakistan, and 4 Latin American countries who will spend 2 or 3 months in the United

States, under the Point 4 Program. The purpose of their visit is to observe American methods of agriculture, health work, education, industry, public administration, and other fields of Point 4 activity.

They will be the vanguard of 200 men and women from 38 countries who are guiding the economic development of their homelands. This Point 4 project constitutes an expansion of the existing leader program under the Smith-Mundt Act, with new emphasis on people responsible, in their own countries, for Point 4 cooperation with the United States.

The project is designed to give these leaders a first-hand impression of the American approach to technical problems. At the same time, they will have an opportunity to discuss with professional leaders here the best ways of adapting new methods and techniques to their own needs.

Their visits are being planned and their itineraries arranged by the agencies of the United States Government concerned with their special fields of interest. They will travel throughout the United States. Plans already include visits to Boston, New York, Detroit, Chicago, Denver, New Orleans, Atlanta, and the Tennessee Valley. Each leader will spend about 3 weeks in Washington at the beginning of the visit.

The first six—all agricultural leaders—are due to arrive in the United States on June 10. They are: Dr. Angel Florentin Pena, the Paraguayan Minister of Agriculture; and a Pakistani Committee on Agricultural Extension Activity consisting of Mohammed Said Khan, Director of Extension Service, Ministry of Agriculture; Abdul Mubin Chowdhury, Deputy Director of Agricultural Administration, Ministry of Agriculture; Mohammed Husain Sufi, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture; Mohammed Amin Bhatti, Assistant Professor of Animal Husbandry and Dairying, George V Institute of Agriculture at Sakrand, and Mrs. A. A. Hussain, Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies for Women in the Punjab. Their tour is being planned by the United States Department of Agriculture.

Others expected to arrive during the summer months, and the agencies responsible for planning their tours, are:

- M. S. Thacker, Director of the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. (Department of Commerce)
- Dr. Eduardo Colcano, Director of the Cartografia Nacional of the Venezuelan Ministry of Public Works, Caracas. (Department of Commerce)
- José Antonio Jove, Chief Engineer, Division of Sanitary Engineering, Venezuelan Ministry of Health, Caracas. (Federal Security Agency)
- Dr. Luis Felipe Vegas, Chief of the Division of Geodesy, Venezuelan Ministry of Public Works, Caracas. (U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey)
- Federico Ruiz Huidobro, Peruvian Superintendent of Banks, Insurance Companies and Corporations, Lima. (Budget Bureau)
- Alberto Rodríguez R. Carpi, Assistant Director of the Peruvian Department of Finance, Lima. (Budget Bureau)

Osvaldo Torres Ahumada, Income Tax Consultant, Santiago, Chile. (Internal Revenue Bureau)
Dr. Roberto L. Petit, President of the Paraguayan Department of Lands and Colonization, Asunción. (Department of Agriculture)
Zafar Hosain Khan, Chairman of the Karachi Port Trust, Pakistan. (Department of Commerce)

Other countries which have been invited to send leaders in Point 4 fields of activity are Afghanistan, Ceylon, Egypt, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Uruguay.

Agricultural Consultants Appointed

Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Technical Cooperation Administrator, has appointed a seven-member board of consultants for the food and natural resources aspects of the Point 4 Program:

Harold B. Allen, Director of Education, Near East Foundation, N. Y.
Edward J. Bell, Administrator, Oregon Wheat Commission, Pendleton, Oreg.
Abner Bowen, Farmer and Businessman, Delphi, Ind.
John H. Reisner, Executive Secretary, Agricultural Missions, Inc., N.Y.
J. Stewart Russell, Farm Editor, Des Moines Register, Des Moines, Iowa.
Rev. L. G. Ligutti, Executive Secretary, *Catholic Rural Life*, Des Moines.
William A. Shoenfield, Organization Consultant, Corvallis, Oreg.

The board met yesterday with Clayton L. Whipple, chief of the Point 4 Food and Natural Resources Division, who explained current Point 4 operations and told of plans for their expansion. The board also heard from the directors of agricultural programs of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and the Department of Agriculture, Point 4 agents, and representatives of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

Dr. Bennett stated that the board has been set up under the Act for International Development, which stipulated that advice should be sought from competent authorities outside government. The Point 4 administrator said he is particularly pleased to obtain the assistance of outstanding leaders in the field of agriculture, which he considers one of the most important phases of the Point 4 Program.

The consultants were in continuous session on June 4 and 5 and will be available, both as a board and as individuals for consultation as problems arise. Most of the members have had wide foreign experience in fields in which the Point 4 Program is active. Their advice should be of great value in planning future projects and in evaluating those in operation.

Point 4 Contract for Water Development in Jordan

[Released to the press June 6]

The Point 4 Administration has contracted with the Knappen, Tippetts, and Abbott Engineering Company, of New York, to carry out a water development project in the Kingdom of Jordan, at the request of the Government of that country.

The company will send a team of experts, headed by Mr. R. D. Gladding, of New York, to Jordan to conduct a 6-months demonstration and training program for the restoration of existing underground cisterns. The team will also direct engineering work needed to restore and construct village reservoirs and small catch basins.

"The training phase of the contract," Technical Cooperation Administrator Henry G. Bennett said, "will provide local technicians to carry on the program as a permanent part of Jordan's economic development."

Some four centuries after the time of Christ, the Roman and Byzantine emperors had cisterns and small water storage basins constructed in the district lying east of the River Jordan for the use of tribesmen and their cattle. The rainfall in this district seldom exceeds 16 inches annually and the need for storage facilities was recognized centuries ago. The ancient wells and catch basins were allowed to deteriorate through neglect until most of them were filled with silt, vegetation, and debris or completely disintegrated.

The Government of Jordan requested Point 4 aid in rehabilitating this essential water supply system. Thirty-nine existing cisterns will be restored, 57 reservoirs will be cleaned and enlarged and a number of new cisterns, reservoirs, and catch basins will be constructed.

The Bedouin tribesmen feed their flocks on the grass which flourishes briefly during the rainy season and until the water holes are dry. Then they move on to permanent water holes. There the grass is sparse and overgrazed. As a result, cattle are scarce and those which survive the rigors of thirst and hunger provide inferior meat.

When the population pressure on East Jordan increases as a result of nomadic movements, the overflow presses into the drier areas east of the river. In years of low rainfall, this situation often leads to famine conditions.

The team of Point 4 experts expects to leave June 17. The rainy season in Jordan starts about December 1 and it is hoped, by then, trainees will have the technical knowledge to supervise the construction of catch basins for use in the dry season.

While the demonstration and training program is under way, the American engineers also will be drawing up a plan for long-term water conservation.

U.S. Urges New Commission for the Control of Armaments and Armed Forces

STATEMENT BY FRANK C. NASH DEPUTY U.S. REPRESENTATIVE¹

The working paper which the United States delegation is formally introducing today, is I think, expressed in terms plain enough to carry their own meaning without the need of detailed explanation.

What may be desirable, however, is a word of explanation as to why we think this an appropriate time for introducing a proposal calling for the establishment of a new forum in which to go forward with renewed disarmament discussions.

Yesterday, the President of the United States sent a message to Congress recommending the enactment of legislation providing foreign military and economic assistance in a total amount of 8½ billions for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952.²

Today, the United States delegation is bringing forward a proposal which has as its aim the development of a fresh and invigorated approach to the problem of disarmament.

To many this presents a paradox beyond comprehension.

But this paradox is more apparent than real.

The program to which President Truman addressed himself in his message to Congress yesterday is a program for peace, not war—a program which the President said he was recommending to Congress “as another vital step along the road to real security and lasting peace.”

The struggle in Korea has made it plain that the sole aim and purpose of those members of the United Nations which are engaged in that struggle is to see to it that the principles of the Charter are maintained in fullest integrity.

The efforts of those nations to build their col-

lective strength are motivated solely by the firm purpose to restrain and outlaw aggression.

Those efforts are succeeding. We have good reason to hope that the resolute stand in Korea of the forces of peace will make it plain that aggression is not going to be tolerated. If any would-be aggressors can be convinced of this determination without having to go through the terrible waste and destruction of another world war to learn the lesson, then we may be approaching the day when we can get down to the task of putting an end to this costly business of having to maintain ourselves in the status of an armed camp.

In a very practical sense, therefore, our present efforts toward the achievement of collective security against aggression may be setting the stage for at last making some real progress toward disarmament.

It is the task of this Committee to help set the stage for this drama to go forward.

It is unfortunate that we have to go through the costly business of rearming in order to set the stage.

After World War II, we hoped it might be possible to set a much simpler stage for a less involved and protracted action. We hoped then that our efforts could be restricted to, and concentrated upon, a one act play to achieve some system for the effective control of atomic energy so as to insure its employment for purposes of peace rather than war. It was further hoped that the problem of disarmament in the related field of armed forces and nonatomic armaments would find a more or less automatic solution in the rapid demobilization of the allied forces.

That is why we urged as one of the very first acts of the First General Assembly the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission. We thought that the control of atomic energy was the problem of most pressing importance and that undivided attention should be devoted to it. We were then the only nation known to possess the atomic bomb and, therefore, would hardly be regarded as having any selfish aims in pressing for the development of some workable system under which we could turn over our atomic resources and facilities to international ownership and control.

¹ Made on May 25 before the Committee of Twelve and released to the press by the U. S. Mission to the United Nations on the same date. The Committee of Twelve was established by the General Assembly on December 13, 1950, and is considering the advisability of a merger between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The membership of the Committee includes the members of the Security Council plus Canada.

² BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 883.

As time went on, however, it became clear that the problem of the reduction and regulation of armed forces and nonatomic armaments was not going to be resolved through voluntary demobilization. Accordingly, it was decided to take up the problem in the United Nations, and for this purpose the Commission for Conventional Armaments was set up—more than a year after the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission. Although the establishment of a separate Commission was strongly opposed by some at the time, it was the view of most that to assign to the Atomic Energy Commission the problems of reduction and regulation of armed forces and nonatomic armaments would inevitably result in retarding the very substantial progress which that body was then making in the development of a plan for the control of atomic energy.

Events have borne out the wisdom of the decision to leave the Atomic Energy Commission free to devote its attention exclusively to the atomic field. The plan of control which the Commission succeeded in developing won the approval of the great majority of the United Nations in 1948—an approval which has several times been reaffirmed, and most recently by the last General Assembly in its peace-through-deeds resolution of November 17, 1950.

In the Commission for Conventional Armaments, somewhat less progress has been made, but the Commission has proceeded through the first two items of its plan of work; and during the past year it has carried on an examination of the problem of developing an effective system of safeguards which would insure compliance with an actual plan of disarmament—item 3 of its plan of work.

In the view of the United States, the work of the two present Commissions has proceeded far enough to demonstrate that it is possible to develop a comprehensive system of armaments control which would be both safe and practicable.

From the very beginning, it has been recognized that any system which might ultimately be developed would have to be a comprehensive one—that is to say, a system which would embrace all types of armed forces and extend to all kinds of weapons and instrumentalities of war. In the work of the two Commissions throughout the past several years, this fact has been constantly borne in mind, and it has been continuously recognized that at some point it would be both necessary and desirable to bring the efforts of the two Commissions into closer coordination under a comprehensive system of control.

In the view of the United States, the work of the two Commissions has now reached a point where it is appropriate to consider ways and means of initiating the requisite coordination and expansion into a comprehensive system of control. In proposing the establishment of a new and consolidated Commission to take over the work of the two present Commissions, the United

States delegation has in view the further important objective of possibly relieving the atmosphere of stalemate which has prevailed in the two Commissions for some time past.

We have, of course, no delusions that an impasse growing out of such fundamental disagreements as those which have prevailed in the past can be resolved by the adoption of any merely procedural device. It is, however, our hope that the demonstration by the peace-loving nations of the world of their determination to stand together, strengthened and united in effective opposition against any further aggression, may lead to a change in some of these fundamental disagreements. Then, as I have already said, we may have a chance of getting ahead with our work toward disarmament. At that time, in our view, it might prove to be of real advantage to have available a new and fresh forum for the pursuit of our objectives. It is to this end that the United States delegation has introduced this proposal here today.

WORKING PAPER SUBMITTED BY U.S.

U.N. doc. A/AC.50/1
Submitted May 25, 1951

General views of the United States with respect to the coordination of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments

Introduction

The United States believes that comprehensive plans to include the international control of all armaments and armed forces should be developed by the United Nations, and, accordingly, that present United Nations efforts should be directed towards the preparation of co-ordinated plans of control which would make possible with appropriate safeguards the regulations, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces, including internal security and police forces. United Nations efforts in the field of armaments and armed forces have to date been assigned to two separate bodies, namely the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. Much useful work has been accomplished by the two Commissions and, in the view of the United States, the appropriate time has now arrived for bringing the respective efforts of the two Commissions into closer co-ordination through the establishment of a single commission. In taking over the functions of the two present Commissions, the new commission would build upon the work already done by them. In particular, the United States believes that the United Nations plan for international control of atomic energy must continue to serve as the basis for the work of the new commission in the atomic energy phases of its work. Nevertheless, the commission should be empowered to consider any other proposals that

would be no less effective than the existing United Nations plan.

A. Organization

The United States believes that a new commission whose primary task would be the development of plans for the international control of all armaments and armed forces—to be called the Commission for the Control of Armaments and Armed Forces—should be established in place of the existing two Commissions in accordance with the following terms and provisions:

1. *Status.* The new commission should be established under and report to the Security Council, which in turn should submit periodic progress reports to the General Assembly.

2. *Composition.* Membership on the new commission should correspond to the membership of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and hence would consist of the members of the Security Council, plus Canada when Canada is not a member of the Security Council.

3. *Sub-committees.* The new commission should be expressly authorized to establish such sub-committees as may be needed in order to carry out the tasks assigned to it, recognizing that the differences in the nature of atomic and non-atomic weapons, as well as in the nature of biological and other instrumentalities of warfare, require the development of varying, but co-ordinated, systems of regulation and control, specially adapted to meet the problems peculiar to the different types of weapons, or instrumentalities.

4. *Technical advice.* Technical advice should be provided as necessary by experts appointed by the member States to assist their representatives.

5. *The Secretariat.* The Secretariat of the new commission should be provided by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

6. *Relationship to other organs of the United Nations.* As a sub-ordinate organ of the Security Council, the new commission should have the normal relationship of such a body to other organs of the United Nations.

7. *Rules of procedure.* With appropriate modifications, the rules of procedure of the Atomic Energy Commission would appear to be adequate to serve as the rules of procedure of the new commission.

B. Functions

1. The primary task of the new commission should be to prepare comprehensive and co-ordinated plans for the international control of all armaments and armed forces, and accordingly, would provide for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces, including internal security and police forces.

2. The new commission should build upon the

work already developed by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for any plan for the control of atomic energy unless and until a better and no less effective system can be devised.

3. The new commission should take into account the inter-relationship of control systems and safeguards necessary to assure the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces, including internal security and police forces, in order to assure that the respective systems of control complement each other.

4. The new commission should develop a comprehensive plan for phasing the implementation of the component systems of control and regulation of all armaments and armed forces.

5. The new commission should formulate a plan for the regulation of the international traffic in arms as part of the comprehensive plan for international control of all armaments and armed forces.

United Nations Documents:

A Selected Bibliography¹

Economic and Social Council

Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Slavery (Second Session). E/1988, E/AC.33/13, May 4, 1951. 36 pp. mimeo.

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Trusteeship Council

Examination of Petitions; Trust Territory of the Pacific Island (Observations of the Administering Authority). T/837, February 16, 1951. 10 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Publications in the *Official Records* series will not be listed in this department as heretofore, but information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Answer to Charges on Edith Cameron Wall's Interviews With Union Labor Officials

[Released to the press May 25]

Correspondence Between Deputy Under Secretary Humelsine and Representative Walter

Following is an exchange of correspondence between Deputy Under Secretary Carlisle H. Humelsine and Representative Francis E. Walter of Pennsylvania concerning allegations regarding Miss Edith Cameron Wall appearing in the New York Daily Mirror of May 14, 1951, under the byline of Victor Riesel.

May 25, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. WALTER: I have your letter of May 14, 1951, in which you requested the Department's comment on an article appearing in the New York *Daily Mirror*, May 14, 1951, under the byline of Mr. Victor Riesel. This article alleges that Miss Edith Cameron Wall, "a representative of the State Department visited the most strategic waterfront union headquarters in this country and urged its leaders to have their followers refuse to load guns and ammo on ships rushing military supplies to our friends in Europe." A further allegation is that Miss Wall "presented a letter from Secretary of Labor Maurice Tobin, which, in effect, urged union leaders to cooperate with her." The union official whom Miss Wall is supposed to have attempted to influence and to whom she is supposed to have presented the letter is identified in the Riesel article as Mr. Joseph P. Ryan, President of the International Longshoremen's Association.

The Department was considerably puzzled by the Riesel article, particularly inasmuch as his various charges against Miss Wall had never been called to our attention, either officially or unofficially, by Mr. Ryan or any other union official. Moreover, it is to be inferred from the article that the alleged incident occurred fairly recently—yet Miss Wall has been stationed in New Delhi, India since July 1950. However, the Department immediately instituted a thorough investigation of the matter.

This investigation established to the Department's complete satisfaction that Miss Wall did have an interview with Mr. Ryan on March 9, 1950, but except for this fact, there is no basis for Mr. Riesel's allegations. With regard to the March 9,

1950, interview, Mr. Ryan took exception to some of Miss Wall's questions as he understood them and on the following day he wired Dr. Steelman, evidencing dissatisfaction and inquiring of her background. This led to an immediate investigation of Miss Wall: the Departments of State and Labor not only examined her record—including her previous security investigation—but investigated with particular care her part in the interview with Mr. Ryan. As part of this investigation, other labor leaders with whom Miss Wall had talked during the week of March 7, 1950, were questioned. These officials were emphatic that Miss Wall had said nothing to them which would corroborate Mr. Ryan's reaction and indeed were high in their praise of her ability and conscientiousness.

On the basis of the State and Labor Departments' investigations, Dr. Steelman informed Mr. Ryan that he was convinced that Miss Wall was "entirely in the clear". Since Mr. Ryan evidenced no dissatisfaction with the report on the matter, either at that time or subsequently, and since the charges contained in the Riesel article of May 14 a year later were not specified in Mr. Ryan's complaint to Dr. Steelman, I submit that the Department's amazement at this article is understandable. As a matter of fact, the Department, in view of the facts which I shall show in this letter, is still at a loss to understand Mr. Riesel's motives in making these unjustifiable and damaging charges against an able and devoted public servant. The actual facts in the matter are the following:

Early in the spring of 1950, Miss Wall returned from her assignment in Copenhagen where she had demonstrated exceptional aptitude in reporting on foreign labor movements. The Department decided to give her further labor reporting training preparatory to reassigning her abroad as an Assistant Labor Attaché. Therefore, Miss Wall was given labor training both in the Department of State and by the Department of Labor. Part of this training involved acquainting

herself with the latest developments in the United States Labor Movement by visiting union headquarters and talking to union officials. In pursuing this course, she visited, among others, the International Longshoremen's Association in New York and talked to Mr. Ryan, the Association's President. This interview was arranged on Miss Wall's own initiative at the suggestion of several other union officials to whom she had talked.

Some of the questions Miss Wall asked Mr. Ryan apparently antagonized him. The day after the interview, March 10, 1950, Mr. Ryan telegraphed Dr. John R. Steelman, the Assistant to the President, as follows:

Was interviewed yesterday by one Ethel [Edith] Cameron Wall purporting to represent both State and Labor Departments. Her personal views on longshoremen in this country loading arms for France did not coincide with views of the A. F. of L., I. T. F., or American Labor Movement. What is her background?

At Dr. Steelman's request, both the Department of State and the Department of Labor thoroughly investigated the incident and established to their complete satisfaction that although Miss Wall might have asked some tactless questions in regard to the internal operations of the union, she had not expressed any views in regard to American longshoremen's loading arms for France nor in any way misrepresented United States policy in this matter. She did mention to Mr. Ryan that there had been strike threats in French ports in connection with Military Assistance Program shipments and that generally such Communist-directed action did not occur in isolated areas. In this connection she asked him if he anticipated agitation for sympathy strikes in American ports. (This question could hardly be judged as an expression of views or as improper.) Dr. Steelman then replied to Mr. Ryan who in turn acknowledged this reply. Copies of Mr. Ryan's telegram to Dr. Steelman, Dr. Steelman's reply and Mr. Ryan's acknowledgment are enclosed for your information. I am also enclosing a copy of Miss Wall's own report of her interview with Mr. Ryan.

Feeling that the case had been settled to the satisfaction of all concerned, and having established Miss Wall's part in the matter, the Department assigned her to New Delhi, India, as Assistant Labor Attaché. She has been in New Delhi since her arrival there, July 22, 1950. No more was heard of the case until the publication of Mr. Riesel's article on May 14, 1951.

The May 14, 1951 article charges, among other things, (a) that Miss Wall urged leaders of the longshoremen's union "to have their followers refuse to load guns and ammo on ships rushing military supplies to our friends in Europe"; and (b) that she presented to Mr. Ryan a letter from Secretary Tobin urging union officials to cooperate with her.

Both of these charges are especially serious when taken in the general context of the whole article for it might reasonably be inferred that Miss Wall

was conducting some sort of pro-Communist activity under the guise of official sanction. Yet none of the other American labor officials whom Miss Wall visited, either before or after her interview with Mr. Ryan, have given any indication whatsoever that her views, actions, or conduct were questionable. Furthermore, at the Department's request the United States Ambassador to India, Mr. Loy Henderson, questioned Miss Wall in regard to the charges and last week he wired the Department that Miss Wall categorically denies both charges. In this connection I should like to point out that during the week of her visits to various union headquarters last year, among the union officials Miss Wall interviewed in addition to Mr. Ryan were the following:

Mark Starr, Educational Director of International Ladies Garment Workers Union
Jay Lovestone, Director of International Activities of I. L. G. W. U.
Julius Hockman, Director of the Joint Dress Board of I. L. G. W. U.
Morris Iushewitz, New York City C. I. O. Council
Willy J. Dorchain, International Transport Workers
Joseph Curran, National Maritime Union
Florence Marston, Associated Actors and Artists—Screen Actors Guild
Eleanor Coit, Director, American Labor Education Service
Jacob S. Potofsky, Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union
Gus Tyler, I. L. G. W. U.
Hugh Brown, New England representative of the Textile Workers Union

The Department has made a point of again asking certain of these union officials whether anything Miss Wall said in her conversation with them would corroborate the charges contained in the Riesel article or the implications of the article. Again they have stated categorically that Miss Wall's statements and conduct during her visits with them could not possibly be construed to corroborate the charges.

It should be a matter of record that Miss Wall has had a complete security investigation, and I can say that her security file does not show a single derogatory reference. Miss Wall worked in various private companies prior to accepting employment with the State Department, including: Freeport Sulphur Company (New York); Arthur Andersen and Company (New York); Barrett Associates (New York); Francis H. Leggett and Company (New York); Montgomery Ward and Company (Illinois); Talon, Incorporated (Pennsylvania). All employees and officials of these companies interviewed, including her immediate superiors, speak well of her and her ability.

In view of the above, I should like to reiterate that the Department considers the allegations against Miss Wall, made by Mr. Riesel's article of May 14, 1951, to be unwarranted and without basis in fact.

I am enclosing for your information a chronology of pertinent events bearing upon Miss Wall's case, including certain documentation which may be of interest.

I am glad to make this report to you for it is

important for men in your position to be informed of the facts in matters of this kind and that attempts to besmirch conscientious and devoted public servants do not go unchallenged.

Sincerely yours,

CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE

Enclosure:

Chronology of Events re Edith Cameron Wall with enclosures:

- A—Miss Wall's report on interview with Ryan.
- B—Telegram from Mr. Ryan to Dr. Steelman.
- C—Letter from Dr. Steelman to Mr. Ryan.
- D—Letter from Mr. Ryan to Dr. Steelman.
- E—Telegram from New Delhi to Secretary of State.

May 14, 1951.

DEAR MR. HUMELSINE: I have just read an article from the New York *Daily Mirror* by Victor Riesel in which he involves one of your employees, Edith Cameron Wall.

Before making further investigation into this matter I should like to have a detailed explanation from the Department with particular reference to Miss Wall's authority to speak for the Department, as well as any information which you may furnish as to the validity of the statement made in the article by Mr. Riesel.

Trusting I may have your prompt advice, I am,
Sincerely yours,

FRANCIS E. WALTER

Chronology of Events

1. Miss Edith Cameron Wall was born June 27, 1912; graduated from Senn High School, Chicago, 1928; from Northwestern University, 1933, (Phi Beta Kappa).

2. Assignments:

- a. Appointed clerk in the Foreign Service of the United States and assigned at Algiers, November 8, 1941.
- b. Assigned Rome, September 19, 1944.
- c. Assigned Copenhagen, May 12, 1947.
- d. Returned from Copenhagen to the United States early in spring of 1950.
- e. Assigned to New Delhi, India, as Assistant Labor Attaché and arrived in New Delhi, July 12, 1950.
- f. Still stationed in New Delhi as Assistant Labor Attaché. Her duties are reporting on labor conditions.

3. Miss Wall in the early spring of 1950 returned home from her assignment in Copenhagen where she had demonstrated exceptional aptitude in labor reporting. The Department of State felt that she should specialize in labor work and that her next field assignment should be as an Assistant Labor Attaché. Therefore, she was given labor training, both in the Department of State and by the Department of Labor. Part of this training involved acquainting herself with the new U. S. labor movement by visiting union headquarters and talking to various union officials. In pursuing this course of orientation, she visited the International Longshoremen's Association in New York and talked to Mr. Ryan, the President of the Association.

Some of the questions Miss Wall asked Mr. Ryan apparently antagonized him. It is reported that these questions had to do with matters of internal operations of the union. At any rate Mr. Ryan wired Dr. John R. Steelman on the day following the interview that Miss Wall's personal views on loading arms for shipment to Europe did not coincide with those of the A. F. of L.,

I. T. F., or the American labor movement and requested information on her background. The following chronology traces the incident from Miss Wall's interview with Mr. Ryan to the present:

a. March 9, 1950—Miss Wall interviewed Mr. Ryan in New York. Her report of the conversation between them is attached as Enclosure "A".

b. March 10, 1950—Mr. Ryan wired Dr. John R. Steelman reporting on his interview with Miss Wall. (Enclosure "B")

c. March 10 or 11, 1950—Dr. Steelman's office referred Mr. Ryan's telegram to the Departments of State and Labor for investigation.

d. March 11—March 22, 1950—The Departments of State and Labor conducted a thorough investigation and advised Dr. Steelman that they were convinced that Miss Wall may have asked some tactless questions in regard to internal operations of the International Longshoremen's Association but that otherwise she was clear of making any ill-advised statements or any misrepresentations. Deputy Under Secretary of State Carlisle H. Humelsine (then Deputy Assistant Secretary) personally made the investigation for the Department of State.

e. March 23, 1950—Dr. Steelman wrote to Mr. Ryan stating in essence that although Miss Wall might have asked some tactless questions, he felt that she was otherwise "in the clear." (Enclosure "C")

f. March 25, 1950—Mr. Ryan replied to Dr. Steelman's letter of March 23 in a tone which was interpreted as meaning that he was satisfied with Dr. Steelman's report on the matter. (Enclosure "D")

g. May 14 1951—(over a year later)—A story by Mr. Victor Riesel appeared in the New York *Daily Mirror* alleging that Edith Cameron Wall, representing the State Department, urged Mr. Ryan to have the longshoremen "refuse to load guns and ammo on ships rushing military supplies to our friends in Europe." The news story further alleged that Miss Wall presented to Mr. Ryan a letter from the Secretary of Labor, urging union leaders to cooperate with her. It was to be inferred from the Riesel article that the incident had taken place very recently. (His account mentioned March 13 as the date of the interview, but gave no year.)

h. May 16, 1951—The Department of State, although reasonably certain that the Riesel story was a distortion and an exaggeration of an incident which occurred the previous year, investigated the story and established (1) that Miss Wall has been in New Delhi, India since July 1950; (2) that she neither possessed nor presented a letter from Secretary Tobin at her interview with Mr. Ryan in March 1950 or previously or subsequently; (3) that the Riesel allegation in his May 14th article that Miss Wall had urged Mr. Ryan to have longshoremen refuse to load arms on ships has no basis in fact. (Ambassador Loy Henderson's recent telegram from New Delhi may be of interest. Enclosure "E")

Summary

The Department has thoroughly investigated the allegations made by Mr. Victor Riesel in his column of May 14, 1951, in regard to Edith Cameron Wall and has established to its complete satisfaction that the charges that (1) she attempted in any way to persuade Mr. Ryan to exert his influence to delay or stop the loading of arms and ammunition on ships destined for Europe, or (2) she presented to Mr. Ryan a letter of introduction or any other kind of letter from the Department of Labor are without basis in fact. To the best of the Department's knowledge, Miss Wall is an exceptionally capable officer of the Foreign Service, and the Department regrets that an attempt has been made to besmirch her well-established reputation as a conscientious and devoted public servant.

Enclosures:

- "A"—Miss Wall's report of the Ryan interview
- "B"—Telegram from Mr. Ryan to Dr. Steelman
- "C"—Letter to Mr. Ryan from Dr. Steelman
- "D"—Letter to Dr. Steelman from Mr. Ryan
- "E"—Telegram from Ambassador Loy Henderson (New Delhi) to the Secretary of State

**ENCLOSURE "A" REPORT OF INTERVIEW
WITH JOSEPH P. RYAN**

Boston, March 13, 1950.

I wish to report in detail my conversation with Mr. Ryan. This was an unpleasant experience which I should have reported immediately. However, in thinking it over it seemed to me that I had inadvertently, and awkwardly, touched on a very sore point with him, which resulted in a rude outburst. Apparently I underestimated the situation. Since the interview was relatively brief (around 30 minutes), the following is a rather full summary.

I had made an appointment to see Mr. Ryan, by telephone the day before, at 2:15 on Thursday, March 9. As I had another appointment at 3:00, I left shortly before the hour since he had not shown up. At 4:30 I telephoned his office and was told that he had been delayed at lunch but would see me then if I could come immediately. This I did.

After I had waited about 15 minutes in his office, Mr. Ryan walked in. He was very brusque and wanted to know why I wanted to see him. I stated that I had been acting as assistant labor attaché in Copenhagen and had been transferred to Paris in the same capacity but that before proceeding to the new post I was on a brief orientation program in the American labor scene. Mr. Ryan's only comment was what did that have to do with him. I then referred to the strike threats in French ports in connection with the MAP shipments and the Communist exploitation of economic union demands for wage increases for political ends. I made the comment that generally such Communist-directed action did not occur in isolated areas and asked if he anticipated agitation for sympathy strikes in American ports in connection with the loading of such ships.

Mr. Ryan replied that there were always agitators in port areas, but that the union's policy was to load the ships; the unloading problem in France was not their affair. He said that no local agitation would stop such loading of ships unless and/or until he received orders from the Secretary of State not to load the ships.

Mr. Ryan's tone of voice and general attitude put an end to any further discussion of this subject. Therefore, as a second topic, I said I was very much interested in his views on employment prospects within his union. I asked whether (a) union membership was in a recession from the peak of war and immediate postwar years and (b) what protective measures they were taking for the future.

Mr. Ryan stated that, contrary to the NMU for example, they had not increased membership during the war years but had allowed anyone able and available to work without joining the union or even issuing a work permit card. As a result, when cargo loading became lighter in the postwar years they were not faced with a swollen membership for the fewer jobs available. He said that the union in effect was a closed union because of the stiff initiation (\$50.00) and dues (\$7.50 quarterly). Although the 30-day clause of the T-H Act theoretically hurt them, actually the stevedores who did the hiring knew who were union members and who were not, and only union members ever got jobs.

I then asked if present port operations were sufficient to assure full-time jobs at least to all union members. Mr. Ryan said categorically no. I then asked how jobs were distributed—whether they were rotated or staggered or what. Mr. Ryan then stated as his and the union's view that, "It was better that some workers have enough work to live on while others went on relief than that all should be on relief." An equal distribution of the available work would not mean enough for any to live on and all would be on relief." He said that the stevedores who did the hiring knew the men, and that there was a difference between men with families and single men or those not too keen on working.

It was at this point that I made the awkward remark which hit a sensitive point. This was not done as a

criticism, but because I felt that I had not understood completely his exposition and wanted to clear up in my own mind what appeared to be such a blatant loophole. I therefore asked if he did not have many grievances among members as a result of favoritism or possible kick-backs to the hiring stevedores. He became quite incensed at this point and said that the fact that the union had this hiring system was proof in itself that it worked and that the men liked it. He added that he had been bothered enough by all kinds of reformists and investigators who had tried to prove graft and kick-backs but that they had gotten nowhere with their trouble.

In an effort to calm the waters I mentioned that on my way home a few weeks ago I had stopped off in Italy where the employment problem among seafaring trades was particularly acute and chronic. The Italian method of meeting the immediate situation was to impose forcibly rotation of jobs, but because the waiting period between jobs was so long this was in effect no solution.

At this point Mr. Ryan jumped up from his desk and shouted at me, "Is it the policy of the Department of State to impose a share-the-work program on me? Are you here to tell me how to run my union?"

His violence shocked me and I answered that I was not stating any official views but merely personal opinion. Before I could continue further, Mr. Ryan said:

"I am not the least interested in your personal views or opinions. I have received you as a representative of the Department of Labor. I don't know who you are and care less. I have already wasted too much time on you. So long!" With this he walked out of the room, into the adjoining file room where I could still hear his voice although I could not understand what he said. I was very upset at his discourteous treatment and the implied insult, but to avoid a further scene it seemed the best thing to leave without further ado. This I did.

I am attaching herewith a brief summary of all interviews thus far. Except for Ryan, I have been received very cordially in every case; the interviews have been extremely helpful, I have been furnished with all kinds of printed material, other contacts suggested, interviews arranged with other persons and I have been asked to call again whenever I was in town and to write if I ever needed anything. All in all, I think the tour has been quite successful.

EDITH WALL

**ENCLOSURE "B": TELEGRAM FROM MR. RYAN
TO JOHN R. STEELMAN**

TO: Dr. John R. Steelman (White House)
FROM: New York
DATE: March 10, 3:43 P. m., 1950

Was interviewed yesterday by one Ethel [Edith] Cameron Wall purporting to represent both State and Labor Departments. Her personal views on longshoremen in this country loading arms for France did not coincide with views of the A. F. of L., I. T. F., or American Labor Movement. What is her background?

JOSEPH P. RYAN,
President, International Longshoremen's Association.

**ENCLOSURE "C": REPLY FROM
DR. STEELMAN TO MR. RYAN**

THE LITTLE WHITE HOUSE
Key West, Florida, March 23, 1950.

DEAR JOE: Immediately upon receipt of your telegram of March 10, which was forwarded to me here at Key West, I returned it to Washington and asked the State Department, by whom Edith Cameron Wall is employed, to give me a report on the matter. I have now received that report and the views of the Labor Department and I have the distinct impression that she perhaps asked some tactless questions and did not make her position entirely clear in her conference with you. At least her record

June 18, 1951

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and contacts with other people with whom she had talked seemed to put her entirely in the clear.

I am glad you called this to my attention. Although in this case the record appears to be on the favorable side there is always the possibility of something being amiss, and in such cases a little checking might be a very good thing.

Sincerely,

JOHN R. STEELMAN

**ENCLOSURE "D": MESSAGE FROM
MR. RYAN TO DR. STEELMAN**

March 25, 1950

DR. JOHN R. STEELMAN
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

FRIEND JOHN: Many thanks for your nice communication of March 23, 1950, regarding Edith Cameron Wall, and although I do not usually go in for reporting people, I felt it my duty in this case.

With best wishes, I remain,
Sincerely,

JOSEPH P. RYAN

**ENCLOSURE "E": TELEGRAM FROM
AMBASSADOR HENDERSON TO SECRETARY ACHESON**

May 1951

FROM: New Delhi
TO: Secretary of State

Wall had no letter from Secretary Tobin or other credentials from Department of Labor when she interviewed Ryan. Neither did she exhibit State Department credentials to Ryan. Appointment was arranged by phone conversation in which she described her State Department connection and duties. Upon arrival for the interview she presented ordinary personal card containing only her name.

Department cable is first she has heard of allegation made by New York *Daily Mirror* article that she requested Ryan to cancel orders to longshoremen, etc. Wall declares it completely untrue.

LOY HENDERSON

Continued from page 974

Recent Releases—

Agreement between the United States and Haiti—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Port-au-Prince September 18 and 27, 1950; entered into force October 12, 1950; operative retroactively from June 30, 1950.

Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in Uruguay. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2158. Pub. 4078. 13 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Uruguay supplementing and extending agreement of October 1 and November 1, 1943, as modified and extended—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Montevideo November 10, 1947, and January 3, 1948; entered into force January 3, 1948; operative retroactively January 1, 1948; and agreement between Uruguay and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs—Signed at Montevideo January 3, 1948.

Health and Sanitation: Cooperative Program in Uruguay. Treaties and other International Acts Series 2159. Pub. 4079. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Uruguay modifying and extending agreement of October 1 and November 1, 1943, as modified and extended—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Montevideo June 25 and July 20, 1948; entered into force October 7, 1948; operative retroactively July 1, 1948.

Publications of the Department of State, January 1, 1951. Pub. 4098. 28 pp. Free.

A cumulative list published semiannually.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2186. Pub. 4120. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Costa Rica—Signed at San José January 11, 1951; entered into force January 11, 1951.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2195. Pub. 4141. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Liberia—Signed at Washington December 22, 1950; entered into force January 22, 1951.

It Has Fallen to Us. General Foreign Policy Series 45. Pub. 4144. 8 pp. [BULLETIN Reprint]. Free.

A letter from the Secretary of State on the meaning of Korea.

Second Semiannual Report to Congress on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, April 6 to October 6, 1950. General Foreign Policy Series 47. Pub. 4190. 50 pp. Limited Distribution.

Printed also as H. Doc. 119, 82d Congress, First Session.

Aid to the Palestine Refugees. Near and Middle Eastern Series 4. Pub. 4191. 18 pp. 10¢.

An over-all summary of the aid programs in the Near East, including map, chart, and pictures.

United States Government International Exchange Opportunities. International Information and Cultural Series 17. Pub. 4198. 24 pp. 10¢.

Discusses the various programs, qualifications, application instructions for both American individuals and foreign nationals. Illustrated.

Point Four Program. Economic Cooperation Series 26. Pub. 4203. 12 pp. Free.

The sixth of a series of progress reports designed to provide background information in summary form on developments in the President's program for world economic progress through cooperative technical assistance.

Analysis of Torquay Protocol of Accession, Schedules, and Related Documents, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Negotiated at Torquay, England, September 1950–April 1951. (Preliminary.) Commercial Policy Series 135. Pub. 4209. 474 pp. \$1.00.

A preliminary analysis was prepared on the basis of information supplied by the United States Government agencies participating in the negotiations at Torquay, England.

Mutual Security for the Free World. General Foreign Policy Series 49. Pub. 4210. 12 pp. 10¢.

A background summary of the purpose and aims of the Mutual Security Program. Map.

Why We Need Allies. General Foreign Policy Series 50. Pub. 4218. 7 pp. Free. [BULLETIN Reprint].

An address by President Harry S. Truman before the Civil Defense Conference at Washington on May 7.

New Jersey and Foreign Trade. 14 pp. Limited distribution.

One of a series of reports prepared by the Department of State in response to a large number of requests. Charts.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U. S. Delegations to International Meetings

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Fifth Session

On June 4, the Department of State announced that J. Paul Barringer, Deputy Director, Office of Transport and Communications and Rear Adm. Paul A. Smith, United States representative on the ICAO Council have been designated as delegates to the fifth session of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization which will convene at Montreal, June 6, 1951. Mr. Barringer and Admiral Smith will also serve as chairman and vice chairman respectively of the United States delegation to the forthcoming meeting. Other members of the delegation are:

Alternate Delegate

David M. French, Division of International Administration, Department of State

Advisers

G. Nathan Calkins, Jr., Chief, International and Rules Division, Bureau of Law, Civil Aeronautics Board
Charles O. Cary, Executive Secretary, Air Coordinating Committee
Alfred Hand, Assistant to Deputy Administrator for Program Planning, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce
Henry T. Snowden, Assistant Chief, Aviation Policy Staff, Department of State
Joan H. Stacy, Aviation Policy Staff, Department of State

The fifth session of the Assembly of ICAO will be of limited scope and will be concerned primarily with administrative, budgetary and fiscal matters necessary to the continuing operation of the Organization. Among the subjects to be considered will be: the budget for 1952; the apportionment of expenses among the contracting states for 1952; the election of a member state to fill a vacancy on the Council; a review of the section of the Council's report to the Assembly dealing with administrative and financial questions; and consideration of the character and scope of future sessions of the Assembly.

June 18, 1951

FAO Council, 12th Session

The Department of State announced on June 8 that Clarence J. McCormick, Under Secretary of Agriculture and United States member on the FAO Council will attend the twelfth session of the Council, which is to begin at Rome, Italy, on June 11, 1951. Other members of the United States delegation are:

Alternate United States Member

Fred J. Rossiter, Associate Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

Associate United States Member

John W. Evans, Acting Deputy Director, Office of International Materials, Department of State

Advisers

James F. Anderson, Division of International Administration, Department of State
Philip V. Cardon, Administrator, Agricultural Research Administration, Department of Agriculture
Howard R. Cottam, Counselor of Embassy, American Embassy, Rome
Mrs. Ursula H. Duffus, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
Ralph S. Roberts, Director of Finance, Department of Agriculture
Thomas E. Street, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture, *Secretary of delegation*
Robert C. Tetro, Attaché, American Embassy, Rome

The forthcoming session, the first to be held since the transfer of the FAO headquarters to Rome, will review a statement, prepared by the Director General of the Organization, on the changes which have taken place in the world food and agriculture situation since the fifth session.

The Council will also make a detailed study of reports and proposals relating to such matters as the long-term objectives of FAO, international investment, full employment, commodity problems, technical assistance, plans for the 6th session of the FAO Conference next November, administrative and financial matters, and nominations for Director General and Chairman of the Council.

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